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Articles
Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular
Representation in Agency Rulemaking
Evan J. Criddle*
Do administrative agencies undermine popular sovereignty when they make
federal law? Over the last several decades, some scholars have argued that
rulemaking by unelected agency officials imperils popular sovereignty and that
federal law shouid resolve the apparent tension between regulatory practice and
democratic principle by allowing the President to serve as a proxy for the "will
of the people" in the administrative state. According to this view, placing
federal rulemaking power firmly within the President's managerial control
would advance popular preferences throughout the federal system.
This conventional wisdom is misguided. As political scientists have long
recognized, the electorate's relative disengagement from the federal regulatory
process prevents voters from developing coherent preferences about most
questions of regulatory policy. Moreover, even if discrete preferences could be
attributed to the people as a whole, the American presidency does not in practice
serve as a reliable proxy for majoritarian preferences in the administrative state.
As an alternative to presidential "proxy representation, " this Article
argues that federal administrative law should seek to promote popular
representation in agency rulemaking through "fiduciary representation. " Like
fiduciaries in private law, all federal officers exercise discretionary
administrative authority for the benefit of those subject to their power, and all
are bound by duties of purposefulness, fairness, integrity, solicitude,
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reasonableness, and transparency. Rather than focus on a representative's
obedience to the ephemeral public will, fiduciary representation emphasizes
agencies ' responsibilities to act deliberatively and reasonably in promoting the
public welfare. On this account, presidential administration is one plausible
strategy for reconciling administrative lawmaking with popular sovereignty, but
it is not necessarily the most promising strategy.
Congress may
counterintuitively promote popular representation in the administrative state by
vesting final rulemaking authority in unelected agency administrators rather
than the popularly elected President.
I.
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Introduction

Ever since Alexander Bickel published The Least Dangerous Branch in
1962, American constitutional theorists have agonized over the supposedly
"countermajoritarian" character of judicial review.' Bickel's quandary can
be summarized succinctly: judicial review empowers federal judges to strike
down legislation in defiance of congressional majorities and the popularly
elected President; yet unlike Congress and the President, federal judges are
arguably poor proxies for the popular will because they are appointed for life,
do not derive their authority directly from any particular constituency, and
are not called to account for their decisions outside the four comers of their
Explaining why judicial interpretations of the
published decisions?
Constitution should trump executive and legislative interpretations, and
under what circumstances, has occupied legal theorists for a generation. 3 At
the heart of these debates lies Bickel's faith in popular representation as the
keystone of American constitutional democracy. 4
Curiously, while Bickel singled out judicial review for censure as "a
deviant institution in the American democracy," he casually dismissed the
notion that administrative lawmaking might also undermine popular

I. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962).
2. !d. at 16-19; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 41 ( 1980) (suggesting that unless courts could develop "a principled approach" to
judicial review "that is not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to representative
democracy, responsible commentators must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply
should stay away").
3. See, e.g. , ELY, supra note 2, at 87 (seeking to resolve Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty
through a "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review"); Rebecca
Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998) (arguing
that the Constitution does not seek to promote majoritarian preferences but rather individual
liberty); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 335-36 (1998) ("[T]he countermajoritarian difficulty
describes ' the dominant paradigm of constitutional law and scholarship, a paradigm that emphasizes
the democratic roots of the American polity and that characterizes judicial review as at odds with
American democracy."' (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword:
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 61 ( 1989))); Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Two: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. I, 48-53
(2002) (discussing generally the evolution of judicial supremacy); Barry Friedman, The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson ofLochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383,
1387 (2001) (arguing that if those familiar with judicial decisions do not believe those decisions are
socially correct, they will be seen as illegitimate); Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 984-88 (2000)
("Modem constitutional theorists have struggled to reconcile the practice of judicial review with
democratic governance."); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 162-71 (2002) ("Constitutional
scholars are fixated on the legitimacy of constitutional courts. They cannot stop talking about the
countermajoritarian difficulty . ... "); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature ofJudicial Review, 91 YALE
L.J. 486,488-92,498 (1982) (observing that countermajoritarianism is not unique to judicial review
but is part and parcel of representative government).
4. BICKEL, supra note I, at 17.
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representation. 5 Bickel believed that federal agencies posed little danger to
the popular will because their lawmaking authority was merely "interstitial or
technical" and could be exercised only pursuant to congressional
authorization. 6 Such sentiments reflected the conventional wisdom of the
early 1960s, a time when agency rulemaking had yet to emerge as the dynamic and pervasive force it is today. 7 When Bickel composed The Least
Dangerous Branch, federal agencies still operated primarily through adjudicatory proceedings, devoting scant attention and few resources to rulemaking
initiatives. 8 Over the next several years, however, a chorus of criticism over
perceived regulatory torpor prompted the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations to emphasize agency rulemaking as a device for
reinvigorating administrative govemance. 9 Congress followed suit, creating
new agencies with rulemaking authority and expanding existing agencies'
rulemaking jurisdiction. 10 As a result of these developments, federal
rulemaking experienced explosive growth during the 1960s and 1970s, with
the annual number of federal rulemaking initiatives increasing almost 500%
between 1960 and 1974. 11 By the 1970s, the dawning "age ofrulemaking" 12
posed an existential challenge to Bickel's democratic faith, which Bickel
failed to anticipate-namely, how to reconcile agency lawmaking with the
republic's constitutional commitments to popular sovereignty and representative democracy.
If anything, subsequent developments have only enhanced this
question's salience. 13 Federal agencies today generate roughly 4,000
regulations per year, far outpacing Congress's annual output of fewer than

5. !d. at 16-18.
6. /d. at 19.
7. Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the
1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1139, 1145-46 (2001).
8. Jd.
9. See id. (discussing the expansion of agency rulemaking throughout the 1960s and 1970s).
10. Jd. at 1148-49.
II. ld. at 1147; see also THEODORE J. LOW!, THE END OF LiBERALISM : THE SECOND REPUBLIC
OF THE UNITED STATES 113 (2d ed. 1979) ("During [the] six-year period [between 1970 and
1976] ... the number of pages published annually in the Federal Register more than tripled and the
number of pages in the Code ofFederal Regulations grew by 33 percent . .. . [I]n 1936 the Federal
Register had a total of 2,400 pages. By 1970 it contained 20,000 pages. By 1976 it contained
60,000 pages."); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 33-34 (3d
ed. 1999) (recounting the creation and expansion of federal administrative agencies between 1960
and 1980).
12. J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 (1974).
13. See I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATfVE LAW TREATISE§ 1.7, at 16-19 (4th ed.
2002) (chronicling the courts' struggle to situate agencies in our governmental system as well as to
determine the proper role for each of our three branches of government with regard to agency policy
making).
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400 bills. 14 The rising tide of federal regulation over the last four decades
cannot easily be dismissed as merely "interstitial and technical" 15 because
federal regulators increasingly claim primary responsibility for resolving
portentous policy questions in fields such as the environment, energy, and
occupational health and safety. 16 Agency regulations commonly have the
force of law, subject to the same sanctions as federallegislation. 17 Although
most agency rulemaking initiatives are subject to judicial review for compliance with congressional standards, federal statutes often provide vague or
ambiguous instructions, and federal courts routinely defer to agencies'
statutory interpretations under the Chevron and Mead/Skidmore doctrines. 18
As a result of these and other developments, the scope of agency rulemaking
powers has expanded dramatically since Bickel's era. 19
Concerns about the perceived countermajoritarian character of
administrative rulemaking have prompted some legal scholars and Executive
Branch officials to suggest that federal administrative law should enhance
popular representation through "presidential administration. "20 They argue
that agencies should recognize the President's legal authority to direct
agency rulemaking initiatives toward policies that best reflect the "will of the

14. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND
COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 2 (2007), http://
www.cei.org/pdf/6018.pdf.
15. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't ofEduc., 550 U.S. 81, 90 (2007) (characterizing
rulemaking as "the kind of highly technical, specialized interstitial matter that Congress often does
not decide itself, but delegates to specialized agencies to decide").
16. See PIERCE, supra note 11, at 34 (listing the agencies formed to address these policy
questions).
17. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§§ 2.25, 4.3, at 90-91, 169 (3d ed. 1991).
18. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (applying the Skidmore
standard to a customs-ruling letter and giving the letter a level of respect proportionate to its power
to persuade); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(holding that federal courts must defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
statutes).
19. See PIERCE, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 10-14 (tracing the historical expansion of the
regulatory state especially in the 1960s-1990s after Bickel's original publishing date).
20. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2335 (2001)
(arguing that the President's national constituency, desire for reelection, and desire for a strong and
favorable legacy create incentives that make administrative rulemaking through presidential
administration more majoritarian); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 105--06 (1994) ("But because the President has a national
constituency-unlike relevant members of Congress, who oversee independent agencies with often
parochial agendas-it appears to operate as an important counterweight to factional influence over
administration."); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential
Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1193-95 ( 1994) ("[T]he
President ... is less vulnerable [than Congress] to targeted appeals by interest
groups .... Significantly, the President sits atop the regulatory system as the leader of the federal
bureaucracy. If anyone is positioned to coordinate diffuse regulatory policy, it is the President, as
leader of the executive branch.").

HeinOnline -- 88 Tex. L. Rev. 445 2009-2010

446

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 88:441

people."21 As the only federal official elected by and accountable to a
national constituency, the President (with the Vice President) arguably
receives a unique popular mandate in matters of national policy? 2 This
mandate, combined with continuing political pressures to honor public
opinion, supposedly ensures that the President will ordinarily resolve regulatory disputes in conformity with majoritarian preferences. 23 Supporters of
presidential administration argue further that enhanced presidential control
over agency regulation would improve the transparency of agency
rulemaking, facilitate interagency cooperation, and ultimately make agencies
more effective and accountable instruments for advancing the public
24
Acting through the President, the American people would be
interest.
better able to craft regulations responsive to their own collective perception
of the common good.
This vision of the President as a proxy for majoritarian preferences has
profoundly influenced public discourse about the administrative state for the
past quarter century. As I will explain more fully in Part II, every president
since Richard Nixon has taken steps to strengthen and formalize White
House influence over agency rulemaking proceedings, from Ronald Reagan's
introduction of rigorous regulatory review by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMBi 5 to Bill Clinton's issuance of formal presidential directives
to spur agency rulemaking. 26 In INS v. Chadha, 27 the Supreme Court famously invoked the rhetoric of presidential popular representation,
emphasizing the President's unique electoral mandate as a prophylaxis
against regional factionalism and special-interest capture. 28 Although the

21. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REV. 23, 35 (1995); Kagan, supra note 20, at 2335; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 105-06;

Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1193-95.
22. See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 35 (arguing that, as the only nationally elected official, the
President (along with the Vice President) has a unique popular mandate in national policy matters).
23. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 875-76 (1997) (describing the argument
that the President's responsiveness to the popular will supports augmenting his control over
administrative agencies). But see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the
Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1217, 1227-46 (2006) (criticizing the "Plebiscitary
President" theory and presenting extensive argument and empirical evidence against the President
as a nonparochial, majoritarian actor).
24. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 20, at 2331-46 (making an extended case for presidential
administration); Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1193-95 (exploring the comparative advantage of the
President over other government actors in tending the administrative state).
25. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127 (1982) (stating that the purpose of the
Office of Management and Budget is to "provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory
process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations
[through OMB review]").
26. See Kagan, supra note 20, at 2290-2303 (tracing the history of the Clinton Administration's
use of presidential directives to steer policy).
27. 462 u.s. 919 (1983).
28. See id. at 948 ("[T]he Presentment Clauses serve the important purpose of assuring that a
'national perspective' is grafted on the legislative process."); id. ("'The President is a representative
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case for presidential administration has been challenged on constitutionae 9
and statutory grounds, 30 the underlying normative vision of presidential
administration as a formula for strengthening popular representation in
agency rulemaking has gained widespread acceptance and continues to attract adherents today. 31
This Article accepts Bickel's assertion that popular representation is
foundational to political legitimacy in a democratic republic, but it challenges
the thesis that presidential administration is an effective strategy for advancing majoritarian preferences in agency rulemaking. Part III demonstrates that
none of the leading arguments for equating the President's preferences on
questions of regulatory policy with the will of the people can withstand close
scrutiny. Over the years, political scientists have assembled a wealth of empirical evidence that national elections do not confer mandates upon
presidents to pursue specific regulatory policies. 32 Nor does the postelection
threat of a future electoral defeat or the disapproving judgment of future historians ensure that presidents will adopt policies consistent with majority
opm10n. In practice, there are simply no guarantees that particular presidential regulatory policies will be more closely correlated with public

of the people just as the members of the Senate and of the House are, and it may be, at some times ,
on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them
all . . .. "' (quoting Myers v . United States, 272 U .S. 52, 123 (1926))).
29. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency 's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U . L.
REv. 1346, 1346 (1994) ("[A] proper structural analysis of the Constitution undermines the
constitutional case for an executive branch with a chain of command organized along military lines
and instead emphasizes the existence of a discernible balance between Congress ' s role in
structuring the executive and the President's inherent and default powers."); Robert V . Percival,
Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J.
963, 966 (2001) (" [A]lthough the president's ability to remove agency heads gives him enormous
power to influence their decisions, it does not give him the authority to dictate substantive decisions
entrusted to them by law.").
30. See Kevin M . Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, I 06
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 263 (2006) (asserting that "the President has statutory authority to direct the
administration of the laws only under statutes that grant to the President in name," contrary to other
prevalent theories of presidential power, which suggest that a statutory grant of power to an
executive officer "implicitly confers that authority upon the President," as well).
31. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 21, at 35 ("Representing as he does a national electoral
college majority, the President at least has an incentive to steer national resources towards the 51%
of the nation that last supported him (and that might support him again) .... ").
32. See generally MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPfNI & SCOIT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MAITERS 2-4 (1996) (arguing that varying levels of political
knowledge within a democratic electorate make it difficult to discern specific policy positions held
by the public); STANLEY KELLEY, JR., INTERPRETING ELECTIONS 135-37 (1983) (presenting
different critics' skepticism of claims of mandate due to the difficulty of isolating voters' intentions
regarding a single issue); Robert A. Dahl, Myth of the Presidential Mandate, !05 POL. SCI. Q. 355,
355-72 (1990) (characterizing the theory of mandates as a myth that has contributed to a pseudodemocratization of the presidency); John A. Ferejohn, Information and the Electoral Process, in
INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 3, 6-19 (John A. Ferejohn & James H . Kuklinski
eds., 1990) (indicating that voters' lack of information and lack of sufficient tools to communicate
their will to officeholders leaves those officeholders with no clear way to decipher the public's

will).

HeinOnline -- 88 Tex. L. Rev. 447 2009-2010

448

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 88:441

opm10n than policies developed through ordinary agency rulemaking
proceedings.
Moreover, the argument for presidential administration
founders on a more basic problem: the public's pervasive ignorance about
regulatory governance. The notion that presidents (or any other public
officials) might serve as reliable proxies for majoritarian preferences in
agency rulemaking becomes indefensible once one acknowledges that the
American public generally knows little about even those regulatory initiatives that most directly affect their interests. For the vast preponderance of
agency rulemaking proposals, the public simply does not have any coherent
33
opinion. As such, the notion that presidents act as proxies for majoritarian
preferences does not furnish a credible account of popular representation in
agency rulemaking.
In Part IV, I argue that American administrative law should abandon the
misguided search for a unitary oracle of the public will and instead safeguard
popular sovereignty34 in agency rulemaking by adopting a fiduciary model of
popular representation. 35
Administrative agencies, like private-law
fiduciaries, exercise discretionary power of an administrative nature over the
legal or practical interests of their beneficiaries, the people subject to state
power. To promote popular representation under the fiduciary model of the
state, administrative agencies must exercise their rulemaking powers in a
manner that satisfies six core principles: purposefulness, integrity, solicitude,
fairness, reasonableness, and transparency. 36 At a minimum, these principles
obligate federal agencies to act deliberately (not reflexively) and
deliberatively (not arbitrarily or unilaterally) when considering potential
rulemaking actions, taking appropriate care to investigate reasonable alternatives and to provide rational explanations for their decisions on the public
record. I argue that Congress should operationalize the fiduciary model in
federal rulemaking by amending the federal Administrative Procedure Act
33. See, e.g., DELLI CARP!Nl & KEETER, supra note 32, at 79-82 (demonstrating through pollresponse results the general public's lack of knowledge regarding current events and politics).
34. I recognize, of course, that "popular sovereignty" is itself a contested concept, and this is
not the place for a detailed explication or defense of the idea. For purposes of this Article, I use the
term "sovereignty" not in the classical Blackstonian sense of"absolute despotic power" but rather to
capture the general idea that the state must respond to the legitimate interests of its subjects,
however defined. See Christopher Morris, The Very Idea of Popular Sovereignty, in DEMOCRACY
I, 5, 12 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2000) ("Goverrunent has authority (i.e., is permitted or has
the right) to act only insofar as it is so authorized, and this authorization must come from the People
governed.").
35. For an argument that U.S. administrative law as a whole rests upon a fiduciary model of
state authority, see Evan 1. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 117, 120 (2006).
36. See Evan 1. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE 1.
INT'L L. 330, 331 (2009); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31
QUEENS L.1. 259, 301-10 (2005) (both discussing these requirements in greater detail); see also 1.1.
Spigelman, Foundations ofAdministrative Law: Toward General Principles ofInstitutional Law, 58
AUSTL. 1. OF PUB. ADMIN. 3, 9 (1999) (noting "similarities between the regulation of the exercise of
public power and the traditional control by courts of equity of the exercise of fiduciary powers,"
including the overarching requirements of purposefulness, rationality, and solicitude).
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(APA) to eliminate the categorical exceptions to notice-and-comment
rulemaking, expand judicial review of agency inaction, and include White
House communications concerning pending agency rulemaking actions on
the public record. The common thread that connects these three proposals is
a vision of agency rulemaking as a locus of other-regarding, purposive, and
deliberative administration.
I conclude in Part V with an exploration of the fiduciary model's
implications for presidential administration.
Although presidential
administration is not inconsistent with the fiduciary model on its face, I argue
that a comparison of presidents and agency heads under the six principles of
fiduciary administration supports the view that agency heads are, by and
large, better positioned to serve as fiduciary representatives in administrative
lawmaking. For example, agency administrators tend to possess greater expertise in their fields of labor and are better positioned than the President to
engage in detailed, deliberative consideration of particular regulatory
proposals. Agency administrators are also more likely to engage diverse
perspectives and provide reasoned justifications for their decisions. As a
result, Congress may promote popular representation by entrusting final
rulemaking authority to unelected agency administrators rather than the
popularly elected President, provided it does so in the right way.
The fiduciary model of popular representation does not ensure that
federal regulations will always embody the will of the people, but neither
does presidential administration in a pluralistic society plagued by pervasive
knowledge gaps about federal regulation. What the fiduciary model does
offer is a vision of administrative lawmaking that promotes the public welfare by honoring congressional delegations of authority to agency heads,
facilitating reasoned justification and deliberative accountability, utilizing
agency experience and expertise, promoting transparency, and minimizing
the dangers of clandestine interest-group influence. By refrarning the concept of popular representation as emanating from reasoned deliberation
among government institutions and between administrative agencies and the
body politic, the fiduciary model furnishes a promising new framework for
rethinking popular representation in agency rulemaking.
II.

Presidential Administration

This Part offers a brief introduction to presidential administration in
federal administrative law. I begin by explaining how the movement to centralize agency rulemaking under the President's managerial control reflects a
pro-majoritarian vision of popular representation in the administrative state.
I then review the last four decades of presidential administration, from
Richard Nixon to Barack Obama, summarizing each president's efforts to
enhance the White House's managerial control over agency rulemaking
through ever-intensifying levels of regulatory oversight.
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A. Three Models of Popular Representation
For generations, American legal scholars have tended to take for
granted that the administrative state's political legitimacy depends, at least in
part, upon its congeniality to popular representation. 37 If popular sovereignty
expresses itself through popular representation, and if administrative
lawmaking frustrates popular representation, then the entire enterprise of
administrative lawmaking could be called into question as a violation of
popular sovereignty. Thus, an enduring challenge for defenders of the administrative state has been to construct a model of agency rulemaking that
would reconcile discretionary agency lawmaking with mainstream democratic theory.
Several models of popular representation have emerged over the years
to fill this gap in administrative law's theoretical foundations. 38 Each of
these models frames the concept of representation in a different way. 39
However, none furnishes a satisfying account of the relationship between
popular sovereignty and administrative lawmaking.
Prior to World War II, the conventional view among judges and legal
academics was that the legislative process satisfied the demand for popular
representation in the administrative state. 4 Congress, acting as popular
representative, would resolve any disputed policy matters in statutory
directives to federal agencies, and agencies, in tum, would translate and implement those generalist directives in specific contexts. 41 This vision of
agencies as dispassionate transmission belts for congressional policy decisions became untenable, however, once Legal Realists turned their sights to
the ubiquity of agency policy-making discretion. 42 In practice, vague legislative directives left too many critical policy questions to be resolved at the
level of agency implementation. 43 Far from acting as mere technocratic

°

37. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1673-75 (1975).
38. See Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay,
94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1618-23 (1985) (illustrating the historical development of the models for
administrative decision making); see also Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review,
98 HARV. L. REv. 505, 577-78 (1985) (describing these models).
39. See Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REv.
567, 569-90 (1992) (discussing the models of administrative law and their theoretical
underpinnings).
40. See Stewart, supra note 37, at 1671-76 (describing the traditional model of American
administrative law).
41. Id. at 1673-75; see also Garland, supra note 38, at 577-78 (describing the primary
theoretical models used by scholars to describe administrative agency decision making); Reich,
supra note 38, at 1618 (discussing the history of models of administrative decision making).
42. See Werhan, supra note 39, at 574-76 (discussing the influence of legal realism on the
theory of administrative law).
43. Stewart, supra note 37, at 1677; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 471 (2003)
(suggesting that the transmission-belt theory proved inadequate in practice due to the vagueness of
legislative directives).
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servants of congressional directives, federal agencies frequently had to
resolve fundamental policy questions with little direction from Congress. 44
One response to the transmission-belt model's collapse was the
emergence of an "interest-group representation" model rooted in publicchoice theory. 45 Rather than focus on Congress's statutory instructions as a
source of democratic legitimacy, the interest-group representation model
characterized the public's direct participation in notice-and-comment
rulemaking proceedings under the APA as a form of popular representation. 46
"The job of the public administrator, according to this vision, was to
accommodate-to the extent possible-the varying demands placed upon
government by competing groups," explained Robert Reich. 47 "The public
administrator was a referee, a skillful practitioner of negotiation and
compromise."48 Agency administrators, like legislators, would seek to
maximize popular preferences as revealed during the public comment phase
of informal notice-and-comment rulemaking. 49 In contrast, judicial review
was viewed with suspicion as a potentially deviant intrusion into majoritarian
rulemaking processes. 50
As Richard Stewart and others have observed, the interest-group
representation model could not withstand scrutiny as a theory of popular
representation. 51 In practice, agencies did not always seek to maximize
popular preferences when selecting between policy alternatives. 52 All too
often, agencies were perceived as catering to narrow interest-group preferences to the neglect of broader public interests. 53 More troubling still, federal
courts rendered only limited assistance as agents of interest-group
"representation reinforcement." Even under so-called "hard look" review of
agency regulations, federal courts did not compel agencies to accept interestgroup comments as binding referenda on regulatory policy; rather, proposed

44. See James 0. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REv. 363,
372 (1976) (indicating that Congress regularly delegates questions to agencies yet gives the agency
"no more guidance than a statutory standard of vaguely-defined breadth").
45. Stewart, supra note 37, at 1760; see also Garland, supra note 38, at 579 ("The interest
representation model evolved in response to widespread disillusionment with both the 'transmission
belt' and 'expertise' models of administrative action.").
46. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA . the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 SUP. CT. REv. 345, 346--48 (revealing that it is common for agencies to allow interested
persons to present oral comments to the agency itself or for agencies to employ public panel
discussions to explore issues).
47. Reich, supra note 38, at 1620.
48. /d. at 1619-20.
49. Garland, supra note 38, at 580-81.
50. Bressman, supra note 43, at 484.
51. Stewart, supra note 37, at 1775-81.
52. See Garland, supra note 38, at 583 (remarking that procedural requirements appeared to
offer little protection when an agency had already determined what course to undertake before the
period of public participation began).
53. MATTHEW A . CRENSON, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: HOW AMERICA SIDELINED ITS
CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 118-21 (2004).
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rules could satisfy judicial review as long as agencies provided a rational
explanation for rejecting interest-group preferences. 54 Viewed in this light,
the interest-group representation model was far less persuasive. Critics began calling into question the value of notice-and-comment procedures,
contending that public participation dramatically increased the administrative
costs of regulation without yielding the desired benefit: popular control over
regulatory policy. 55
As the interest-group representation model fell into disfavor, the late
1970s and 1980s witnessed a return to Bickel's majoritarian paradigm as the
starting point for understanding popular representation in the administrative
state. 56 Influential public officials and scholars embraced Woodrow
Wilson's vision of the President as the only "national voice" for the
American people as a whole 57 and argued that administrative law could promote majoritarian preferences more effectively by committing all
discretionary rulemaking decisions to the President's managerial contro1. 58
The President, by virtue of his or her national election and accountability to a
national constituency, would be better equipped to represent national
majoritarian preferences than any political appointee or career civil servant. 59
Therefore, by accepting direction from the White House on questions of
regulatory policy, agencies could supposedly become more responsive to the

54. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(explaining that an administrative rule needs to have a rational basis in the facts); cf Stewart, supra
note 37, at 1775, 1777 ("[P]ublic participation in [informal rulemaking] proceedings may have little
impact on agency policy determinations.").
55. Bressman, supra note 43, at 485; Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying"
the Rulemaking Process, 42 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-90 (1992); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok:
The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173,
241 (1997).
56. See Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy
for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 343, 369 (2009) (describing how problems with the
interest-group representation model led commentators to tum to an alternative model for the
administrative state that emphasized majoritarianism's embrace of political accountability).
57. See Dahl, supra note 32, at 360 ("There is no national party choice except that of President.
No one else represents the people as a whole, exercising a national choice. . . . The nation as a
whole has chosen him, and is conscious that it has no other political spokesman. His is the only
national voice in affairs." (quoting WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 70, 200-{}3 (1908))); Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77
FORDHAM L. REv. 1837, 1849 (2009) (describing Wilson as crafting a "twentieth-century picture of
the President as the unique voice of democratic self-rule, interpreter-in-chief of the electoral tumult
that carried him into office").
58. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 21, at 59 (mentioning that the President is accountable to a
nationwide electorate); Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process,
84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1410-11 (1975) (reviewing arguments for why the President should have a
broader role in regulatory decision making); Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1180-81 (remarking on
the growing consensus that the President is the party best equipped to break regulatory gridlock).
59. See Brown, supra note 3, at 549 (claiming that independent agencies are independent from
voters); Cutler & Johnson, supra note 58, at 1409 (arguing that elected officials are needed for
efficacious economic regulation); id. at 1411 (arguing that the President is the most accountable
elected official).
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public will, while also energizing their administration, sparking innovation,
improving interagency coordination, and rendering the administrative state as
a whole more transparent to public scrutiny. 60 As this Bickelian conception
of presidential popular representation attracted supporters across the political
spectrum, some commentators claimed "a growing degree of consensus for
the proposition that all roads to regulatory reform lead to (or, perhaps more
accurately, from) the President."61
B. Operationalizing Presidential Administration

Over time, presidents have taken proactive steps to operationalize
presidential administration, pressing beyond their traditional oversight and
advisory roles toward more robust managerial control over agency
rulemaking. 62 The modern history of presidential administration arguably
begins in 1970, with President Nixon's creation of the OMB to coordinate
interagency review of rulemaking proposals involving environmental
protection, consumer protection, and public health and safety. 63 Drawing on
Nixon's example, Gerald Ford later created a Council on Wage and Price
Stability to combat inflation by studying the fiscal impact of proposed
regulations. 64 Similarly, Jimmy Carter unveiled his own Regulatory Analysis
Review Group to evaluate proposed regulations that were likely to have an

60. See. e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580-81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a "unitary Executive" is "essential" to energize government decision making in a
national-security context (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 146-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961))); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727-32 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a "unitary Executive" promotes individual liberty and uniform application of the law);
BICKEL, supra note I, at 186 (arguing that the President should have the ability to dismiss
subordinate Executive Branch officials at will because this would improve their responsiveness to
the exigencies of his political responsibilities).
61. Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1180.
62. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY PRESIDENT 304 (2008)
(noting that some commentators argue "that the increase in discretionary, policymaking authority
wielded by administrative agencies has strengthened the case in favor of the unitary executive");
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 1116 (1995) ("Almost since the birth of the modem administrative agency, American presidents have
struggled to assert more centralized control over the regulatory state."); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer,
or "the Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702 (2007)
("Our most recent Presidents, if not their predecessors, seem to have been at pains to convey the
impression that they are personally responsible for the conduct of domestic governance, to a degree
that extends to the resolution or decision of particular administrative issues .... ").
63. See Exec. Order No. 11,541,3 C.F.R. 140, 140 (1970}, reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 501 (1994)
(creating the Office of Management and Budget); James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the
Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J.
851, 863-64 (2001) (noting that during the Nixon Administration, other agencies were required to
submit rules to the OMB, which served a coordinating function); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential
Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 546-47 (1989) (explaining that
agencies would submit new rules to the OMB, then "[t]he OMB staff integrated the comments and
criticisms and transmitted them" back to the agencies).
64. Percival, supra note 29, at 987; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 14.
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economic impact equal to or exceeding $100 million65 and created the Office
of Infonnation Review and Analysis (OIRA), the OMB office now primarily
responsible for White House regulatory review. 66 Seeking to minimize
burdensome federal regulations and facilitate interagency coordination,
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush expanded executive
oversight through more rigorous OMB review, 67 Reagan's Presidential Task
Force on Regulatory Relief, and Vice President Dan Quayle's Council on
Competitiveness. 68 Although President Clinton relaxed OMB review somewhat during his tenure, in many respects he claimed even greater oversight
authority than his predecessors. For instance, Clinton famously issued over
one hundred presidential orders directing agencies to adopt regulations targeting social ills such as youth smoking and gun violence-no doubt seeking
to compensate for his inability to advance his legislative agenda in an inThroughout these three decades of
creasingly hostile Congress. 69
intensifying White House regulatory management, proponents of these
changes argued that presidential participation was vital to safeguard the political legitimacy of federal regulation. 7 Critics, on the other hand, warned
that OMB review and the White House's "hidden-hand" influence undermined agency legitimacy by enabling interest-group capture and subverting
congressionally mandated programs. 71
Upon taking office in 200 1, President Bush employed a similarly
multifaceted strategy for influencing agency rulemaking, drawing on
precedents set in previous administrations. 72 What was truly remarkable

°

65. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152, 154 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994); see
also Percival, supra note 29, at 987 (describing the creation of the Regulatory Analysis Review
Group).
66. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, § 3503, 94 Stat. 2812, 2814-15
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (1994)); Percival, supra note 29, at 988.
67. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127 (1982) (declaring goals to increase agency
accountability for and presidential oversight of the regulatory process).
68. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 294-95 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the apex of the "hidden-hand" approach to executive
oversight of administrative agencies).
69. See Kagan, supra note 20, at 2304-07 (arguing that President Clinton displaced
administrative agency heads with a wide array of agency directives). As Dean Kagan has noted,
Clinton's efforts to pursue his policy agenda through the administrative process began in earnest
following the 1994 congressional elections, when Republicans gained a majority of seats in the
House of Representatives, and accelerated in 1998, during the waning days of his postimpeachrnent
tenure. !d. at 2283-84.
70. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 43, at 490 (noting that the administrative state is
purportedly legitimized by the recent increase in presidential control because agency decisions are
brought under political and, therefore, popular control).
71. See, e.g., Symposium, The Council on Competitiveness: Executive Oversight of Agency
Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 297, 298 (1993-1994) (recommending that the public be given
greater access to the review of agency rulemaking in order to further regulate independent-agency
and executive-agency actions).
72. See Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at AI
(chronicling the Bush Administration's efforts to persuade and pressure agency officials behind the
scenes).
HeinOnline -- 88 Tex. L. Rev. 454 2009-2010

2010]

Fiduciary Administration

455

about Bush's second term, however, was his Administration's effort to
formalize White House control over agency rulemaking policy. In January
2007, Bush issued Executive Order No. 13,422, amending a previous Clinton
directive, which had required all agencies to designate an agency employee
to serve as the agency's liaison, or "regulatory policy officer" (RPO), for
OIRA review. 73 Bush's executive order proclaimed that all RPOs must be
political appointees, required agencies to obtain OMB approval of their
RPOs, and thereby made RPOs de facto political gatekeepers for agency
rulemaking actions. 74 Executive Order No. 13,422 also removed language
from the previous Clinton directive, which had provided that RPOs "shall
report to the agency head" 75 and that the agency's regulatory plan "shall be
approved personally by the agency head." 76 While the practical import of
these developments has been disputed, many critics argued that in Executive
Order No. 13,422, Bush crossed the Rubicon dividing agency rulemaking
discretion from presidential administration by formally supplanting
administrators' statutory authority. 77
While the Obama Administration is still in its infancy, the President's
first weeks in office sent mixed messages about his commitment to
presidential administration. On the one hand, the President drew praise from
critics of presidential administration when he promptly revoked Executive
Order No. 13,422 and directed the OMB to develop recommendations for
redesigning White House regulatory review. 78 On the other hand, President

73. Exec. Order No. 13,422,3 C.F.R. 191 (2008).
74. /d.
75. Compare id. § 5(b) ("[E]ach agency head shall designate one of the agency's Presidential
Appointees to be its Regulatory Policy Officer, advise OMB of such designation, and annually
update OMB on the status of this designation."), with Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(2), 3 C.F.R.
638, 645 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) ("[E]ach agency head shall designate a
Regulatory Policy Officer who shall report to the agency head.").
76. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,422 § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. at 191 ("Unless specifically authorized
by the head of the agency, no rulemaking shall commence nor be included on the Plan without the
approval of the agency's Regulatory Policy Office."), with Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c)(l), 3
C.F.R. at 642 ("[E]ach agency shall prepare a Regulatory Plan[, which] shall be approved
personally by the agency head.").
77. See Amending Executive Order 12,866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Part
I and Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the Comm. on
Science and Technology, I lOth Cong. 142 (2007) (statement of Brad Miller, Subcommittee
Chairman) (noting that the order creates a new requirement of "market failure" for any agency to
promulgate a rule, a requirement which follows an argument that Congress explicitly rejected);
Amending Executive Order 12,866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Part 11: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology,
I lOth Cong. 129 (2007) (statement of Peter L. Strauss) (asserting that Executive Order 13,422
"diffuses political authority within the agency that [is generally] entrust[ ed] to the agency head").
78. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009) (revoking Executive Order
No. 13,422 and requiring federal agencies to cease all enforcement thereof immediately);
Memorandum of January 30, 2009: Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009)
(requesting from OMB a set of recommendations related to federal regulatory review, comprising
subjects such as guidance on transparency and encouraging public participation in the regulatory
process).
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Obama has emphasized his commitment to ongoing centralized review of
agency regulation/ 9 and there are strong signs that he might seek even
greater managerial control over the administrative state than his
predecessors. For example, Obama has selected several leading proponents
of presidential administration for prominent positions in his administration,
including Dean Elena Kagan to serve as Solicitor General and Professor Cass
Sunstein to head OIRA. 80 He has also endeavored to centralize agency policy making by appointing White House policy "czars" over critical policy
areas such as health-care reform, urban-affairs policy, energy, and climate
change. 81 These powerful administration officials have been tasked with directing agency rulemaking from their White House offices without
undergoing congressional confirmation and while operating behind the veil
of executive privilege. 82 As the White House continues to grapple with the
current economic crisis, additional moves toward centralized administrative
lawmaking are likely to follow. Thus, while it remains to be seen how far the
Obama Administration will ultimately go in its efforts to operationalize
presidential administration, the early returns portend a significant shift
toward White House management of agency rulemaking.
III. Proxy Representation
To its defenders, presidential administration gives the electorate a
powerful voice in federal regulation. 83 Presidents serve as proxies for the
people, translating general public preferences into specific directives to adminiStrative agencies. The more influence presidents exercise in agency
rulemaking, the theory goes, the more likely federal regulations will reflect

79. Memorandum of January 30, 2009: Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. at 5977 (Feb. 3,
2009).
80. Sasha Issenberg, Obama Taps Harvard Law School Dean as Solicitor General, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nationlarticles/2009/0l/06/
obama_taps_harvard_Iaw_school_dean_as_solicitor_general/; Transition at OIRA: What Kind of
Change?, OMB WATCH, Jan. 13,2009, http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3869.
81. Igor Kossov, Byrd Calls Obama's Czars Dangerous, CBS NEWS.COM, Feb. 25, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/02/25/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry4828759.shtml; see also
David J. Rothkopf, It's Official: Obama Creates More Czars than the Romanovs, FOREIGN POLICY,
Apr.
16,
2009,
http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/16/its_official_obama_
creates_more_czars_than_the_romanovs (identifying eighteen policy "czars" in the Obama
Administration).
82. See Peter Baker, And Now Let the Jockeying Begin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. I, 2009, § WK, at I
("More than any president in years, Mr. Obama came into office creating new White House czars
and special envoys to supervise various hot-button issues at home and abroad, overlaying an
additional set of actors upon a bureaucracy already scratchy about who's in charge."); Jonathan
Martin, West Wing on Steroids in Obama W.H., POLITICO, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/0 I 09/17908.htrnl ("Obama is moving to create perhaps the most powerful staff in
modem history-a sort of West Wing on steroids that places no less than a half-dozen of his top
initiatives into the hands of advisers outside the Cabinet.").
83. Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for
the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 343, 369 (2009).
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majoritarian preferences and thereby advance the will of the people in agency
rulemaking. 84
Setting aside for the moment whether Bickelian majoritarianism offers a
normatively attractive paradigm for conceptualizing the will of the people, it
is apparent in any event that the majoritarian argument for presidential administration fails on its own terms. Specifically, the majoritarian argument
assumes that the general public possesses coherent preferences on particular
questions of federal regulatory policy when this is plainly not the case. Nor
is it self-evident that federal regulations would more likely satisfy majoritarian preferences (to the extent such preferences exist at all) when developed
and refined under White House management. Sadly, the case for viewing the
American presidency as a reliable proxy for the will of the people collapses
all too quickly once its assumptions are exposed to close scrutiny.

A. Three Fictions of Presidential Administration
The idea that presidential administration promotes majoritarian
preferences rests on three misconceptions about the President's relationships
to voters and to the federal bureaucracy: the fiction of popular authorization,
the fiction of popular accountability, and the fiction of presidential
management.

1. The Fiction of Popular Authorization.-Americans have become
accustomed to hearing such appeals to election returns as reflecting popular
authorization for their policy agendas. President John F. Kennedy famously
declared that even a single-vote margin of victory would represent a decisive
"mandate" for change. 85 During the height of the Watergate scandal,
President Richard Nixon likewise attempted to parry criticism by invoking
his own electoral "mandate" from the 1972 presidential election. 86 More
recently, news media have hailed the decisive electoral victories of
George W. Bush in 2004 and Barack Obama in 2008 as representing "solid
mandate[s]" for their respective policy agendas. 87 For better or worse, this
recurrent idea of the presidential mandate has become a central trope of our

84. !d.
85. Todd S. Purdum, All About the President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at AI.
86. KELLEY, supra note 32, at 99.
87. See John F. Harris, For BliSh and GOP, a Validation, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2004, at AI
("[President Bush] seemed to win validation for a campaign that unabashedly stressed conservative
themes and reveled in partisan combat .... "); Doyle McManus & Janis Hook, Majority Win Could
Make Second Term More Partisan, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at AI ("Bush can claim a solid
mandate .... "); Brian Knowlton, Obama Vows to Cut Budget Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at
A4 (quoting then President-elect Obama: "I don't think that there's any question that we have a
mandate to move the country in a new direction.").
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political mythology. 88 At least with respect to questions of regulatory policy,
however, the reality of modern electoral politics tells a very different story.
Political scientists have long recognized that presidential elections can
rarely, if ever, be construed as conferring genuine mandates for presidents to
pursue particular regulatory policies. 89 Perhaps the most obvious difficulty
with interpreting election-night victories as mandate-conferring constitutional moments is the nebulous relationship between presidential elections
and majoritarian preferences. Presidents Kennedy, Clinton, and George W.
Bush each reached the White House without winning a majority of the
popular vote. 90 Woodrow Wilson, the presidential mandate's intellectual
champion, prevailed in 1912 with only 41.9% of the popular vote. 91
Abraham Lincoln won in 1860 with only 39.8%. 92 If Americans truly
desired to elect faithful proxies for popular preferences, the Electoral College
system established in Article II, Section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment
would hardly seem the most promising design. Indeed, the historical record
suggests that the framers of the Constitution designed the indirect Electoral
College system for presidential succession precisely to combat fears that
popular elections might fall prey to tyrannical majoritarianism or
demagoguery. 93
Polling data from past presidential elections further undermine the
mandate theory of popular authorization. Political scientists have found that
most voters cast their votes based primarily upon "candidate centered"
factors such as experience and temperament rather than "issue centered"
factors such as a candidate's specific views on Social Security reform, tax

88. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 246 (2005) ("The
transformation of the presidency into a plebiscitary office is not a minor detail. It is a dominating
fact of constitutional life."); Adler, supra note 23, at 875 ("In recent years, the Plebiscitary
President-by which I mean a President who is, in some way, responsive to the judgments,
preferences, beliefs or other attitudes of a majority of the citizenry-has loomed increasingly large
in ... the legal literature on the separation of powers and administrative law.").
89. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
90. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 82-83 (2006); see also Nzelibe,
supra note 23, at 1261 ("[In] the fifteen presidential elections in the postwar period ... the winner
failed to obtain a majority of the popular vote [in six elections], and in seven the opposition had a
majority in at least one house of Congress.").
91. LEVINSON, supra note 90, at 83.
92. !d.
93. See ACKERMAN, supra note 88, at 5 (asserting that the Electoral College was created as a
means to prevent a "political opportunist" from achieving the presidency); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10
(James Madison), supra note 60, at 80-84 (arguing that a republic is superior to a pure democracy
for the purposes of safeguarding the nation from the tyranny of majority factions); Jeffrey K. Tulis,
The Two Constitutional Presidencies, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 91, 93-96
(Michael Nelson ed., 1984) (discussing the historical evidence suggesting that the founders
considered demagoguery and majority tyranny two major risks of pure democracy).
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cuts, or foreign policy. 94 Indeed, even the most decisive electoral victories
are difficult to construe as conferring issue-centered popular mandates. As
Robert Dahl has observed, the two presidential elections that most closely
resembled landslide victories during the last half-century were President
Lyndon B. Johnson's victory in 1964 and President Nixon's in 1972;95 in
each case, however, only one in five voters cited issue-centered factors-as
opposed to candidate-centered factors-as their primary reason for supporting their chosen candidates. 96 It would be difficult, therefore, to dispute
Dahl's conclusion that "no elected leader, including the president, is uniquely
privileged to say what an election means-nor to claim that the election has
conferred on the president a mandate to enact the particular policies the
president supports. " 97
Even if Americans did cast their votes based solely on candidates'
policy positions, presidents still would not be entitled to interpret national
election returns as a sweeping popular mandate to direct agency rulemaking.
The Constitution's framers generally viewed Congress-not the Presidentas the best representative of popular opinion, believing that the collective
wisdom of individual legislators would enable that body to "think, feel,
reason, and act like" the people at large.98 In contrast, the presidency was
never well suited to serve as a "national voice" in the administrative state
because no single public officer could reasonably be expected to reflect
popular opinion in all matters of regulatory policy. As Peter Shane and others have observed, presidential candidates pose a classic "bundled
preferences" problem: elections require an up-or-down vote on candidates'
aggregate platform, forcing voters to compromise some personal preferences
in order to advance other deeply held commitments. 99 When undertaking this
calculus of compromise, particular questions of regulatory policy tend to
have low salience for voters; indeed, polls suggest that even issue-minded
voters are likely to cast their votes based on candidates' perceived
"competence," "experience, record in public life, [or] strength of leadership"

94. See Francis Rourke, Presidentializing the Bureaucracy: From Kennedy to Reagan , in THE
MANAGERJAL PRESIDENCY 123, 126 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 1991) (suggesting that the "candidate
centered" nature of presidential elections limits the ability of the president to claim a mandate).
95. Dahl, supra note 32, at 364.
96. /d.
97 . /d. at 366; see also KELLEY, supra note 32, at 4 ("The count of votes tells no one how far
voters will follow the victorious candidate, or for how long, or in what direction.").
98. IV JOHN ADAMS, Letter to John Penn, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES 195, 205 (1851); see also I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 141 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (asserting that the Legislature ought to be the "exact
transcript" of society).
99. Peter M . Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of
Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REv. 161, 197-99 (1994); see also Cynthia R.
Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 987, 998 (1997) (asserting that the bundling problem is stronger in a presidential election
because the bundles of issues are greater in both size and complexity).
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rather than their views on particular policies. 100 Most voters know far too
little about American government generally-let alone the inner workings of
the administrative state-to make informed decisions regarding presidential
candidates' views on specific questions of regulatory policy. 101 As Barry
Friedman has noted, the premise that the President will represent the will of
the people "assumes there is such a thing as an identifiable majority will,
when there is not." 102 Political scientist John Ferejohn concurs: "Nothing
strikes the student of public opinion and democracy more forcefully than the
paucity of information most people possess about politics." 103 Considered
against this backdrop, the notion that national elections give the President a
popular mandate to use particular means or pursue particular ends in administrative rulemaking is problematic, at best.
My purpose in critiquing the fiction of presidential authorization is not
to suggest that there is no correlation between candidates' campaign
platforms and voter behavior in national elections. Clearly voters are not
wholly indifferent to candidates' substantive views on the issues of the day,
and these views in tum shape voter perceptions of candidates' wisdom and
character. What the empirical record does suggest, however, is that
presidential elections communicate far less information about majoritarian
preferences than the proxy model of the American presidency assumes:
although the voting public decides which candidate will be vested with
presidential powers, they almost never communicate coherent directives
regarding specific policy choices in specific regulatory fields. 104
100. KELLEY, supra note 32, at 101, 107.
I 0 I. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 9 (1992) ("Survey research has continued to
confirm that Americans ... do not know very much about politics."); llya Somin, Political
Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1291 (2004) (reviewing
evidence of massive voter ignorance about politics); cf Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1253, 1267 (2009) ("If citizens do not know about the existence
of a policy issue, they will probably not have formed any meaningful preferences on its most
desirable resolution.").
102. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 583 , 629 (1993).
But see PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note I 01, at 14 ("[P]ublic opinion as a collective phenomenon is
nonetheless ... meaningful, and indeed rational in a higher, if somewhat looser, sense.").
103. Ferejohn, supra note 32, at 3; see also B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN,
BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 146 (1994) ("On the
vast majority of issues dealt with by the bureaucracy, citizens have no specific demands or needs;
they operate in a vague, impressionistic world, which leaves politicians with a wide zone of
acceptance."); Sornin, supra note 101, at 1304 ("The most important point established in some five
decades of political knowledge research is that the majority of American citizens lack even basic
political knowledge.").
104. By 1975, Bickel himself acknowledged the inadequacy of national elections as barometers
for actual popular preferences:
Elections, even if they are referenda, do not establish consent, or do not establish it for
long. . . . Masses of people do not make clear-cut, long-range decisions. They do not
know enough about the issues, about themselves, their needs and wishes, or about what
those needs and wishes will appear to them to be two months hence.
ALEXANDER M . BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 16 (1975).
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2. The Fiction of Presidential Accountability.-Advocates of
presidential administration argue in the alternative that the President's unique
political accountability qualifies him or her to serve as a proxy for majoritarian preferences in agency rulemaking. 105
In theory, presidential
accountability could derive from various political pressures, including the
ambition for reelection, the threat of impeachment, the influence of the
President's political party, the need to maintain popular support for legislative initiatives, the desire to be followed by a like-minded successor, and
concerns about the judgment of history. Citing each of these factors,
supporters of presidential administration have argued that the President "has
an incentive to steer national resources toward the 51% of the nation that last
supported him (and that might support him again)." 106 The presidency's
"unitary power structure, its visibility, and its 'personality'" supposedly
strengthen public accountability, mitigate the threat of factionalism, and ensure that the President will speak with a "national voice." 107
Over the last few years, this argument for presidential administration
has been hotly contested across the legal academy. Glen Staszewski has
characterized electoral accountability as "wildly unrealistic" because it requires a degree of public engagement with federal administration that far
exceeds actual practice. 108 Heidi Kitrosser and Peter Shane have shown that
presidential control over information flow within the administrative state can
obscure the President's influence, impeding public monitoring and thereby
diluting political accountability. 109 Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the proxy
model of popular representation, however, is the electorate's relative disengagement from federal administrative governance. By all accounts, the vast
majority of agency rulemaking actions simply fly under the public radar,
eluding the attention of all but the most well-informed members of the
electorate. 110 One cannot readily assume, therefore, that the public as a
whole has any discernable majoritarian "will" about particular regulatory
policy questions, much less that the President could readily discern and implement that "will" in agency rulemaking proceedings.
Even in cases where a president's actions attract intense public scrutiny,
the problem of bundled preferences resurfaces to frustrate proxy
105. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No
Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568 (1987) ("White House oversight places accountability
precisely where it should be, namely, where the electorate can do something about it.").
106. Calabresi, supra note 21, at 35.
107. Kagan, supra note 20, at 2332; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 94-95. But see Heidi
Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1770 (2009) (arguing that
presidential administration increases the President's control over information and thereby
undermines accountability).
108. Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1266.
109. Kitrosser, supra note 107, at 1770; Shane, supra note 99, at 204-09.
110. See DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 32, at 79-82 (reporting statistics from the
authors' own surveys showing that the American public is generally unaware of significant details
of current and historical domestic policy).
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representation. Voters may disapprove of a president's efforts to manage
agency entitlement programs but reelect the president nonetheless based on
sympathy for the president's views on foreign policy or social issues. 111
Moreover, between elections the electorate has few effective tools to hold
presidents accountable for even the most disastrous regulatory failures, 112 as
illustrated vividly by the disastrous credit crisis of 2008 and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's inept response to Hurricane Katrina. For
all intents and purposes, Sandy Levinson's assessment would seem to be correct that a "noncriminal president" receives "an unbreakable four-year lease
on the White House." 113
Other political constraints fail to bridge the gap between presidential
preferences and the popular will. Presidents Carter and George W. Bush famously took pride in bucking popular opinion, reasoning that the presidency
must provide visionary leadership, not adhere slavishly to the latest polling
data. 114 While President Clinton reportedly sought to adhere more closely to
public opinion, 115 he also openly defied public opinion in several high-profile
decisions. 116 Rifts between White House policy and public opinion are likely
to multiply and expand during a president's second term, when he or she no
longer needs to campaign for reelection and may more safely discharge political debts to ideological allies. 117 The political constraints on presidential
policy making are hardly sufficient, therefore, to qualify the President as a
reliable proxy for majoritarian preferences in agency rulemaking.
3. The Fiction of Presidential Management.-The notion that
presidents serve as reliable proxies for the body politic fails for yet another

Ill. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, I 03
MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2078-80, 2134-35 (2005) ("[V)oters cannot, through the process of election,
hold a public official accountable in any real sense.").
112. See LEVINSON, supra note 90, at 116 (noting the difficulties in removing a president who
is not criminal but merely incompetent, with reference to observations by William Schuerman).
113. ld.atll7.
114. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Politicization of Public Opinion: The
Fight for the Pulpit, in THE SOCIAL DIVIDE 83, 96 (Margaret Weir ed., 1998) ("Carter advertised his
defiance of public opinion as a sign of his responsible 'trustee' style of leading .. . ."); Bush Again
Defends His Presidency, Posting of Katharine Q. Seelye to The Caucus: The Politics and
Government Blog of the Times, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/0l/20/bush-againdefends-his-presidency/?hp (Jan. 20, 2009, 19:52 EST) ("! never took an opinion poll to tell me
what to think.").
115. See James M. Perry, Clinton Relies Heavily on Pollster to Take Words Right out of the
Public 's Mouth, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1994, at A16 (noting that George H.W. Bush spent $216,000
on public-opinion polls in 1989 and I 990, whereas Clinton spent nearly ten times that amount in
1993 alone).
116. See Jacobs & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 98 (discussing Clinton' s "don't ask, don't tell"
policy).
117. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, A Last Push to Deregulate: White House to Ease Many Rules,
WASH. POST, Oct. 31,2008, at AI (noting that "[t]he doors at the New Executive Office Building
ha[d] been whirling with corporate officials and advisers pleading for relief or, in many cases, for
hastened decision making" from the outgoing Bush Administration).
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reason: centralizing policy-making authority in the presidency does not
ensure that the President will personally manage agency rulemaking. In most
cases, presidential management of agency rulemaking is a fiction that merely
disguises a different kind of bureaucratic management. 118 The President cannot feasibly review or respond to every agency rulemaking proposal
personally; instead, he or she necessarily relies on the White House's everexpanding internal bureaucracy-including, but not limited to, OIRA-to
oversee rulemaking proceedings across the administrative state. 119 Indeed,
the more assertive presidents have been in seeking managerial control over
the federal bureaucracy, the more they have been forced to bureaucratize the
presidency itself. 120 The notion that presidential administration facilitates
popular representation becomes far too attenuated as the President increasingly delegates critical management functions to unelected White House
staff.
Recent empirical work underscores just how bureaucratized presidential
administration has become. In one important study, Professors Lisa
Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh conducted interviews with dozens of
past and present Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials in an effort to discern the form and extent of White House participation in agency
rulemaking. 121 Interviewees explained that the White House did not consistently speak in a singular "national voice" on questions of public policy. 122
Instead, the EPA often received conflicting guidance on proposed rulemaking actions from as many as nineteen different White House offices. 123 Far
from providing univocal presidential policy direction, these internal tensions
within the White House tended to foster "a climate of internal combat and
coalition-building." 124 The Bressman-Vandenbergh study also found that
118. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1308 (2006) (noting that the President's limited ability to invest time
into regulatory oversight gives agencies like OIRA free rein to make many regulatory decisions).
119. See CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, PRESIDENCY BY PLEBISCITE: THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA IN
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 85-86 (1993) (arguing that any Executive Branch administrative
strategy must accept the reality that "no president can be expected to fully control the executive
bureaucracy"); Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1277-80 (discussing the inefficacy ofOIRA's
prompt letters as a means of regulatory reform); Thomas 0. Sargentich, Normative Tensions in the
Theory of Presidential Oversight of Agency Rulemaldng, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 325, 326 (1993)
("[Any] notion of national political accountability needs to be tempered by the reality that the
president is generally not the person doing the overseeing.").
120. See PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 164 (2007) (discussing the Volcker
Commission's concern with the rapid increase in numbers of politically appointed bureaucrats in the
federal government); James P. Pfiffner, Can the President Manage the Government?, in THE
MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 94, at 3, 17 (arguing that effective control over the
expanding responsibilities of the Executive Branch increasingly requires delegation to cabinet
appointees).
121. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 63-64 (2006).
122. !d. at 93.
123. !d. at 49-50, 68.
124. !d. at 68.
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White House review of agency rulemaking tended to be "unsystematic" and
"selective," depending primarily on "the interest of the particular officials
involved" rather than the rigorous, systemic oversight that would ensure adequate representation across the administrative state under a proxy model of
presidential administration. 125 For this reason alone, the prevailing theory of
presidential administration as a form of proxy representation remains
unpersuasive in practice.

B. The Pathologies of Presidential Administration
Far from advancing majoritarian preferences in agency rulemaking, we
might expect presidential administration to frustrate these preferences (to the
extent they exist at all) in many contexts. One need look no further than
public-opinion polls from the waning hours of George W. Bush's presidency
to appreciate the profound disconnect that may develop between presidents
and their constituents on general policy values and objectives. 126
Centralizing rulemaking authority in the White House may facilitate
countermajoritarian lawmaking by enabling presidents to cater to "narrow,
sub-national political interests, including those playing major roles in [their]
national campaigns." 127 This threat of White House capture is far from
merely hypothetical: one influential study found that 56% of the meetings
that OIRA held to discuss proposed or final agency rulemakings from 1981
to 2000 involved only "narrow interests" (i.e., industry groups), as compared
to just 10% that involved only "broad interests" (i.e., nonprofit public interest
Thus, the available evidence suggests that presidential
groups ). 128
administration does not reliably reduce the threat of countermajoritarian
agency rulemaking and may, in fact, greatly exacerbate the problem.
Presidential administration also raises the specter of regulatory
entrenchment. If agencies were to adopt countermajoritarian regulations
pursuant to presidential directives, these regulations would become cemented
into federal law and would not be easily dislodged. To overturn unpopular

125. /d. at 49.
126. By November 2008, Bush's public disapproval rating peaked at 76%, the highest
disapproval rating in six decades. Paul Steinhauser, Belief that Country Heading in Right Direction
Is at All-Time Low, CNN POLITICS.COM, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/
11/10/bush.transition.poll/index.html. In February 2008, 71% of those polled disapproved of his
handling
of
economic
policy.
Presidential
Ratings-Issues
Approval,
GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poli/1726/Presidential-Ratings-Issues-Approval.aspx.
In March
2008, 91% of respondents indicated that the Bush Administration was either treading water or
affirmatively weakening environmental protections. See Environment, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.
com/poii/1615/Environment.aspx (reporting that of the sample polled, 52% believed environmental
protection under the Bush Administration had been "kept about the same," while 39% believed
protections have "weakened").
127. Thomas 0. Sargentlich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay
Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2007).
128. Steven P. Croley, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 858 (2003).
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federal regulations, Congress would have to override the president's veto--a
daunting proposition-or wait for a new president with different views to
take office. Federal courts are ill-equipped to provide an alternative check on
countermajoritarian presidential administration because White House directives are not ordinarily subject to judicial review and the mere unpopularity
of proposed regulations is not, in and of itself, a basis for relief under the
APA. 129 Thus, committing rulemaking authority to the President's formal
control could entrench putatively countermajoritarian regulations against
Congress's legislative override. 130
To be fair, Bickel's distinction between maJontarian and
countermajoritarian lawmaking may be too crude a standard for evaluating
the performance of judges, legislators, presidents, agency administrators, and
other state actors. 131 As Bickel himself conceded, the will of the people is
best understood as a conceptually convenient "abstraction," not a readily
ascertainable empirical reality. 132 Relatively few questions that arise in
agency rulemaking-or in federal governance generally-attract sufficient
public attention to generate coherent majoritarian preferences. Yet to the
extent that it is ever possible to draw conclusions about public preferences
from public-opinion polls or other indicators, it appears that there are many
good reasons to abandon the notion that presidents are reliable proxies for the
public will in agency rulemaking.
In theory the United States could take measures to strengthen the link
between presidential policy making and public preferences such as instituting
binding national referenda on questions of regulatory policy or developing
procedures for the electorate to censure or recall presidents who disregard
public opinion. In practice, however, such reforms would require profound
changes to our constitutional system and have little chance of success in the
near term. Moreover, given the public's profound disengagement from the
administrative process, it appears unlikely that even such radical innovations
would ensure that presidential rulemaking was grounded in genuine majoritarian preferences. Simply put, the American presidency is ill-suited to serve
as an oracle for the will of the people in the administrative state.
IV. Fiduciary Representation
If plebiscitary presidential administration is descriptively and
prescriptively implausible, what consequences follow for the otherwise
uncertain relationship between popular sovereignty and administrative

129. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1309.
130. Of course, the credibility of a presidential-veto threat will depend upon contextual factors
such as the regulation's relative visibility and political salience.
131. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 102, at 582 (arguing that courts are not systematically less
majoritarian than other branches of government).
132. BICKEL, supra note I, at 16.
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governance? In what sense might federal regulators represent the people in
rulemaking proceedings, if not as proxies for majoritarian preferences?
In this Part, I explore these questions from a new perspective by
developing a theory of popular representation in administrative lawmaking
based on the idea that government regulators serve as fiduciaries for the people subject to their power. This model of popular representation draws on
arguments first advanced in my recent article, Fiduciary Foundations of
Administrative Law, 133 but extends these insights about the legal architecture
of administrative law generally to further illuminate the fiduciary character
of agency rulemaking authority in particular. To promote popular representation under the fiduciary model, agency regulators must respect the state's
subjects as free and equal autonomous agents, and act to promote the public
welfare, not necessarily the public will.
To set the stage for this argument, this Part begins with a brief history of
the fiduciary concept. I then explain how administrative governance may be
conceptualized as a fiduciary relation between public institutions and the legal beneficiaries of government action, and I identify six general principles
that define and structure the state-subject fiduciary relation. Lastly, I
consider how the fiduciary character of public administration might inform
federal administrative law today by setting out three applications of the
fiduciary model to agency rulemaking.

A. Conceptualizing Fiduciary Representation
As a first step toward reclaiming the fiduciary model of state authority,
we will need to unpack the fiduciary concept and clarify how the fiduciary
model might transcend mere metaphor and provide a meaningful theory of
popular representation for contemporary administrative law.
The fiduciary model of popular representation hearkens back to a
tradition in political theory that predates Wilson's now-ascendant view of the
presidency as the people's singular "voice" in national affairs. 134 Centuries
before Wilson, the concept of state institutions and officials as "agents" or
"trustees" for the people shaped the thought of luminaries such as Cicero, 135
John Locke, 136 Edmund Burke, 137 James Madison, 138 and Alexander

133. Criddle, supra note 35.
134. See Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REv.
1139, 1140 (1996) (noting that the origin of the English trust, or use, has been traced to four
possible ancient sources). For Wilson's view, see Dahl, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
135. See CICERO, Moral Goodness, in DE OFFICIIS, l.XXV.85, at 87 (Walter Miller trans.,
1997) (1913) ("[T]he administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be
conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted.").
136. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government (1690), in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 87, 87
(Ernest Barker ed., 1947) (asserting that legislative power is "only a fiduciary power to act for
certain ends" and that "there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the
legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them").
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Hamilton. 139 The fiduciary model was deeply influential among the
American political elite during the founding period and throughout the early
republic, as reflected in the republican vision "that each American had an
equal part in forming the sovereignty of the United States, the body of political power." 140 Leading intellectuals of the late nineteenth century such as
John Stuart Mill and Frederick Maitland likewise characterized public powers as being held in "trust" by the state for the benefit of the nation as a
whole. 141 Although the fiduciary concept of state legal authority is perhaps
somewhat less pervasive in public discourse today than in times past, it

137. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, Discontents in the Kingdom, in BURKE'S POLITICS: SELECTED
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE ON REFORM, REVOLUTION, AND WAR 3, 28
(Ross J.S. Hoffinan & Paul Levack eds., 1949) (1770) ("The king is the representative of the
people; so are the lords; so are the judges. They are all trustees for the people .... ").
138. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 294 ("The federal
and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with
different powers and designed for different purposes.").
139. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 60, at 397 ("The
delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of
every man engaged in the administration of public affairs speak for themselves.").
140. JEDEDIAH PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY: REBELS, REACTIONARIES, AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 59 (2009); see also PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IV ("[A]ll power
[is] ... derived from, the people; therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or
executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them."); PURDY, supra, at
10 ("[This] idea that power flowed from the whole political community to the government, which
held it in 'trust,' was central to American political language in the nineteenth century."); Andrew
Jackson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1833) (referring to the office as a "sacred trust" that he
"receive[d) from the people"); James Madison, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1809) (referring to
his "awful sense of the trust to be assumed"); James Madison, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1813) (invoking "the momentous period at which the trust has been renewed"); James Monroe, First
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1817) (referring to the need for a President to hold "a just estimate of
the importance of the trust and of the nature and extent of its duties" and to American government
officials as "the faithful and able depositaries of their trust" that of the American people).
141. See Frederick William Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in SELECTED ESSAYS !51, 220
(H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936) ("[W]hen new organs of local government are being
developed, ... it is natural ... that their governmental powers should be regarded as being held in
trust. Those powers are, we say, 'intrusted to them,' or they are 'intrusted with' those powers.");
John Stuart Mill, Representative Government, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 230, 321 (1947) (describing public power as a "trust" that must be "fulfill[ed]"); see
also Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 (1900) (describing administrative agencies as "mere
agencies or trusts"); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879) ("The power of governing is a
trust committed by the people to the government. . . . The people, in their sovereign capacity, have
established their agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals, and the
protection of public and private rights."); ERNEST BARKER, ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT 53 (1945)
(describing the representative parliament as "the trustee which the nation has authorized to act on its
behalf; and it exercises sovereign power, under the terms of the trust, for the nation"); HENRY J.
FORD, REPRESENTATIVE GoVERNMENT 146 (1924) (describing representative government as "[b]y
its essential nature ... a system of trusteeship"); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION 128 (1967) ("Representation certainly is, as many writers have pointed out, a
fiduciary relationship, involving trust and obligation on both sides.").
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continues to shape how federal and state courts conceptualize the role of
public officers in our government. 142
Historically, the fiduciary concept has its roots in private law
paradigms. Beginning in the twelfth century and continuing on throughout
the Middle Ages, 143 the law of England recognized the "use" or "trust" as a
legal device for authorizing certain individuals to manage assets or perform
other services subject to strict legal and ethical duties of fidelity to their
beneficiaries' interests. 144 Over time, Anglo-American courts extended the
fiduciary concept to an expanding family of legal relations, including agency,
partnerships,
guardianships,
receiverships,
corporations,
security
arrangements, franchises, and, more recently, certain confidential counseling
relations such as the attorney-client and doctor-patient relationships. 145
What distinguishes fiduciary relations such as these from other legal or
extra-legal relationships? At their most basic level, all fiduciary relations
share a common structure: the law entrusts a party (the fiduciary) with discretionary administrative authority to manage the legal or practical interests
of another party (the beneficiary). 146 Within the fiduciary relation, the
beneficiary becomes dependent upon the fiduciary to pursue her interests,
and she is unable, either legally or practically, to protect herself fully against
the abuse of fiduciary power. 147 The law therefore obligates the fiduciary to
exercise entrusted discretionary power in furtherance of legally authorized
purposes 148 and with due care for the beneficiary's interests. 149 In cases

142. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airport Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, 501
U.S. 252, 272 (1991) (describing government institutions as fiduciaries for the people); Nuesse v.
Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (describing the fiduciary nature of public legal authority
as a "living tenet of our society"); Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433 (N.J. 1951)
(describing public officials as fiduciaries with an "inescapable obligation to serve the public with
the highest fidelity"); Black River Regulating Dist. v. Adirondack League Club, 121 N.E.2d 428,
433 (N.Y. 1984) ("[T]he power conferred by the Legislature is akin to that of a public trust to be
exercised not for the benefit or at the will of the trustee but for the common good.").
143. See Avini, supra note 134, at 1143-47 (describing the creation and employment of the use
in England prior to the enactment of the Statute of Uses in 1535, which aimed to convert all
equitable uses into legal estates); id. at 1150 (referencing postmortem transfers of land in twelfthcentury England).
144. See id. at 1143-47 (reviewing the early applications of the use in England, including by
individuals to convey land to the clergy; by tenants to avoid burdens imposed by the lord or by the
law; and by individuals to circumscribe constraints imposed on the conveyance oflegal estates).
145. See Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 199, 216-18 (1992) (explaining that the fiduciary duty applies to doctors and
lawyers and has been incorporated into the law of agency, partnerships, and business organizations,
as well as regulation of confidential relationships such as doctor-patient and lawyer-client).
146. See Paul Baron Miller, Essays Toward a Theory of Fiduciary Law 146 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author) (defining the fiduciary relationship as "one in which one
person-the fiduciary-enjoys discretionary power to set or pursue the practical interests of
another-the beneficiary").
14 7. See id. at 178 (describing the "core structural qualities" of fiduciary relations as
"inequality of power, dependence, and vulnerability").
148. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 808 & n.48 (1983); see also
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. I, 10 (1976) ("The extent of the
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where fiduciaries have multiple beneficiaries, the duty of loyalty requires
even-handed treatment among beneficiaries. 150
To facilitate adherence to these duties, fiduciary law also contains
prophylactic, information-forcing rules, which promote transparency and
facilitate monitoring and enforcement. 151 Fiduciaries are required to "keep
clear and accurate" records 152 and give beneficiaries a complete account of
their performance upon request. 153 Fiduciaries must comply with these requirements whether or not beneficiaries are able to show they have suffered a
distinct injury. 154 These ancillary duties of disclosure are necessary to ensure
fiduciaries' adherence to their primary fiduciary duties. 155
Evan Fox-Decent and I have argued that the fiduciary relation's legal
basis is best perceived through Immanuel Kant's conception of parent-<:hild
fiduciary relations in The Doctrine of Right. 156 According to Kant, legal
rights reflect a person's moral capacity to place others under legal
obligations. 157 Each person has an innate right to as much freedom as can
reasonably coexist with the freedom of others. 158 The function of law on this
account is to enshrine rights within a regime of equal freedom in which
persons cannot unilaterally impose the terms of interaction on others. 159
Turning to the parent-<:hild relationship, Kant explains the moral basis
of parents' fiduciary obligation to their children as a consequence of parents'
unilateral creation of a person "endowed with freedom" who cannot survive

fiduciary's discretion is demarcated, and the fiduciary obligation is imposed in order to compel a
proper exercise of that discretion within the scope of the authority thus delineated.").
149. See Nagel v. Todd, 45 A.2d 326, 327 (Md. 1946) (stating that a fiduciary must "'act
primarily for the benefit of [his beneficiaries], in matters connected with his undertaking"' (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1928)); Cristallina, S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods
Int'l, 117 A.D.2d 284, 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (indicating that agents have an implied duty to
use their best efforts for their principals); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) ('The
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill as
a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property.").
150. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928) (describing this "rule of undivided
loyalty" as "relentless and supreme").
151. See, e.g., 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS§ 172, at 452- 54 (William
Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987) (describing the openness and diligence of trustees that courts
require with regard to accounts of beneficiaries).
152. !d.
153. !d.
154. Cf Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 456, 495 (2004)
(suggesting that compliance with the requirements of common law and statutory schemes such as
Sarbanes-Oxley is integral to meeting the good faith standard independent of actionable harm).
155. See 2A SCOTT, supra note 151, § 172, at 452-56 (noting that one of the reasons for
requiring proper records is to prevent the trustee from hiding misconduct).
156. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 352-54; Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 276-81.
157. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 353.
158. !d.
159. !d.
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without their support. 160 Once parents in the exercise of their freedom bring
a child into the world, recognition of the child's equal freedom as a "citizen
of the world," coupled with the child's practical or legal inability to consent
to the relationship of dependence, places parents under a fiduciary obligation
to provide for the child's basic security by making "the child content with his
condition so far as they can." 161 Parents' fiduciary obligations to their children thus reflect the constraints that a child's innate dignity as a free and
autonomous moral agent places on parents' equal freedom. 162
Extending Kant's theory of innate right beyond familial relations, the
same demands of rightful conduct vis-a-vis children extend likewise to other
fiduciary relationships such as trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal,
corporation-shareholder, and lawyer-client. 163 Although most beneficiaries
are not children or incompetents and ought not to be treated as such, all beneficiaries are vulnerable to the fiduciary's abuse of legally entrusted
administrative power over their legal and practical interests. 164 Absent the
law intervening to mediate fiduciary relations, beneficiaries would be subject
to intolerable domination-the fiduciary's capacity to exercise administrative
power arbitrarily. 165 The law therefore authorizes fiduciaries to exercise administrative powers on behalf of their beneficiaries, but subject to the strict
limitations that arise from beneficiaries' vulnerability and moral capacity to
place the fiduciary under legal obligations. 166
As in any form of representation, fiduciaries are bound to act
deliberately, not reflexively. "When we act for someone else we may not act
on impulse," observes Hannah Pitkin. 167 Instead, "we ought to have reasons
for what we do, and be prepared to justify our actions to those we act for,
even if this accounting or justification never actually takes place." 168 The
deliberate character of representation thus involves a formal principle of
justifiability, which informs both proxy representation and fiduciary
representation, albeit in different ways. In proxy representation, the proxy is
160. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 98-99 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991)
(1797).
161. !d.
162. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 354.
163. !d. at 349.
164. !d.
165. See HENRYS. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE
ENDS OF POLICY 34 (2002) ("Domination is the capacity to make people's lives or situations worse
by arbitrarily imposing duties on them, or by arbitrarily purporting to impose duties on them."). See
generally PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 51 (1997)
(developing a republican theory of freedom as "non-domination").
166. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 352 (describing the administrative power of a
state as being within the confmes of a fiduciary obligation due to the vulnerability of its subjects).
167. PITKIN, supra note 141, at 119.
168. !d.; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United
States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, I 04 (2007) ("[To]
be subject to administrative authority that is unreasoned is to be treated as a mere object of the law
or political power, not a subject with independent rational capacities.").
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expected to identify and implement the principal's actual preferences. 169 A
fiduciary representative, on the other hand, need not always conform her
actions to her beneficiaries' preferences. 170 Indeed, it is precisely the
discretionary character of a fiduciary's administrative power (due typically
to the beneficiary's absence, incompetence, or abdication of authority) that
distinguishes fiduciary relations from other forms of representation. 171 When
exercising these discretionary powers, a fiduciary must independently assess
what course of action will best promote her beneficiaries' welfare. 172 While
beneficiaries' actual preferences are germane to this assessment and must not
be dismissed arbitrarily, they are not always dispositive for the fiduciary as
they would be for a proxy. 173 This is so, in part, because the fiduciary is often expected to draw on superior information, experience, or expertise. 174
The fiduciary may also have multiple beneficiaries with competing perceptions of the common good. 175 To honor beneficiaries' equal dignity as free
and autonomous agents and thereby to avoid domination, the law directs that
a fiduciary must be prepared to explain how her actions are reasonably calculated to promote her beneficiaries' welfare, not merely her own. 176 Thus,
unlike a proxy, the fiduciary's signature duty is one of loyalty to her
beneficiaries' legitimate interests. 177
Fiduciary relations' other-regarding purpose distinguishes fiduciary
representation from proxy representation in another important sense:
fiduciary representation is not only deliberate but also deliberative. To satisfy the duty of care, a fiduciary representative must exercise her
administrative discretion through a deliberative process, which includes, at a
minimum, clarifying the nature of the problem or opportunity, discerning the
range of permissible actions, evaluating the pros and cons of each alternative,
and developing an objectively reasonable rationale for the action taken. 178

169. See PITKIN, supra note 141, at 90 ("The representative [in political representation] is not to
give new opinions to his constituents, but to reflect those they already have.").
170. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
173. See Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Fiduciary Obligations in Clinical Research, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 424, 433 (2006) ("True exercise of discretion requires the fiduciary to make free
and independent judgments . ... ").
174. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory ofFiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, 1413 (2002) (highlighting the "superiority" of the fiduciary as a quality courts use to infer a
fiduciary relationship).
175. See, e.g., Katherine Traylor Schaffzin, Eyes Wide Shut: How Ignorance of the Common
Interest Doctrine Can Compromise Informed Consent, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 71, 94-95 (2008)
(describing attorneys' fiduciary duties to multiple parties in common representation situations and
the conflicts that may arise).
176. Cf Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 814 (1983) (discussing the
ability of a principal to monitor a fiduciary by requiring the fiduciary to report his activities).
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 8.01 (2006).
178. Cf Brehm v. Eisner (Disney II), 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Irrationality is the outer
limit of the business judgment rule." (footnote omitted)); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873
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The fiduciary representative must give consideration to relevant experience
or expertise, be it the fiduciary's own expert judgment or the consultation of
other specialists.179 She may not arbitrarily neglect or ignore readily accessible sources of information that may be important to her decision. 180 Above
all, the principle of formal justifiability dictates that a fiduciary's exercise of
discretionary power must follow prudent and rational deliberation, and the
fiduciary must provide a complete and satisfactory accounting of her stewardship upon request. 181 Reasoned deliberation addresses the threat of
administrative domination and serves the purpose of all fiduciary relationsthe pursuit of the beneficiary's welfare. Fiduciary representation thus offers
a robust alternative to proxy representation, reframing representation as the
exercise of lawfully entrusted administrative authority to manage another
person' s legal or practical interests for their benefit.

B. Fiduciary Representation in the Administrative State
Against this background, the traditional republican conception of state
officers and institutions as agents and trustees for the people comes into
sharper focus. 182 The idea that public officials serve as fiduciary representatives for persons subject to their power comports with the constitutive
features of fiduciary relationships generally. 183 All agents and instrumentalities of the state-including the primary legislative, executive, and judicial
institutions-are vested by law with discretionary administrative powers to

(Del. 1985) ("Under the business judgment rule there is no protection for directors who have made
'an unintelligent or unadvised judgment."' (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-W. Glass Co., 167 A. 831,
833 (Del. Ch. 1933))).
179. See Patricia A. Vlahakis, Takeover Law and Practice 2008, in 40TH ANNUAL INST. ON
SEC. REGULATION, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1087, 1119
(2007) (describing consultation of legal and financial experts as part of the duty of care).
180. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993) (holding that directors
violated their duty of care because they did not "adequately inform" themselves of all reasonably
available material information before approving a merger agreement). There is some debate among
legal scholars over whether the duty of care is properly characterized as a fiduciary duty or a tort
duty. Compare Steven Elliot, Fiduciary Liability for Client Mortgage Fraud, 13 TR. L. INT'L 74,
76 (1999) (arguing that even those who stand in a fiduciary relationship with another may be liable
for tort duties), with Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc'y v. Mothew, [1998] EWHC (Ch) I, [16C]-[17F]
(Eng.) (endorsing the view that the duty of care owed by a fiduciary is not unique to the fiduciary
relationship), and Peter Birks, The Content of the Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 33-37
(2000) (arguing that there is not a separate fiduciary duty of care).
181. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, Ill n.9 (Del. Ch.
1986) ("[A] decision by disinterested directors following a deliberative process may still be the
basis for liability if such decision cannot be ' attributed to any rational business purpose,' or is
'egregious."' (citations omitted)); Vlahakis, supra note 179, at 1119 ("The core of the duty of care
may be characterized as the directors' obligation to act on an informed basis after due consideration
of the relevant materials and appropriate deliberation.").
182. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 239 (describing
governments as "agents" and "trustees" for the public).
183. See Criddle, supra note 35, at 135 (drawing comparisons between the features of fiduciary
law and administrative law).
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make, interpret, or enforce laws for the citizenry. 184 These powers relate
primarily to objectives that, in Lincoln's words, private parties "need to have
done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves-in their
separate, and individual capacities." 185 Because public powers are entrusted
solely to the state by law and cannot be exercised by private parties without
legal authorization, the public depends upon government officers to exercise
their powers in the public interest, and the public is uniquely vulnerable to
officers' inept or unreasonable misuse of administrative power. All agents
and instrumentalities of the state are therefore subject to fiduciary duties in
discharging their responsibilities. 186
Popular representation under the fiduciary model does not depend upon
electoral authorization or accountability, nor does it seek to guarantee that
public officials satisfy the will of the people. Instead, fiduciary representation acknowledges that the will of the people is usually an abstraction
without a reliable referent in the real world. As such, the fiduciary model
focuses on public officers' fidelity to their legal mandates and the public
welfare, as well as satisfaction of the basic duties of care and loyalty. For
example, a police officer may be said to represent the people when making
an arrest if the arrest serves a lawfully authorized purpose, is not an abuse of
discretion under the particular circumstances, and is not tainted by a selfinterested motive or discriminatory intent. A federal district judge likewise
represents the people when sentencing a criminal defendant if she demonstrates that the sentence is fundamentally fair and reasonable in light of the
evidence before the court. 187 Similarly, under the fiduciary model, a member
of Congress may represent the people if she supports controversial legislation
based on her rational assessment of the public interest-even if she is unable
to divine any coherent public will concerning the legislation. 188 In each of
these contexts, popular representation rests on the fiduciary's satisfaction of
her basic obligations as fiduciary for the people subject to her administrative
powers. Whether public officials are elected by, or directly accountable to,
the electorate might strengthen or weaken the case for popular representation,
but neither of these considerations is a necessary criterion for fiduciary
representation as long as the fiduciary faithfully exercises her entrusted
powers.
184. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 352.
185. Abraham Lincoln, To Do for the People What Needs to Be Done (July I, 1854), in
LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACY 63, 64 (Mario M. Cuomo & Harold Hozer eds., 1990).
186. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 352 (arguing that because private parties
cannot exercise public powers "legal subjects are peculiarly vulnerable to public authority" and
therefore are owed a fiduciary obligation).
187. See Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070, 110307 (2008) (comparing private fiduciaries and public officials, and explaining that public officials
must be prepared to justifY their actions according to legal authorization).
188. See Dimitrios Kyritsis, Representation and Waldron's Objection to Judicial Review, 26
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 733, 743 (2006) (arguing that legislators ought to "reconstruct from
[public preferences] the best possible vision of the just and well-governed polity").
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Dimitrios Kyritsis has argued that the fiduciary model of state legal
authority is preferable to proxy representation in the legislative process
because it "more accurately reflects ... the practice of political
representation, as we know it," and thus "better captures our conception of
representation." 189 Public preferences in republican democracies "[are]
neither immutable nor inviolable," he observes. 190 Instead, voters rely on
legislators to clarify what is at stake in proposed legislation, and legislators in
tum shape public preferences. 191 The dynamic "relationship between the
representative and the constituents he represents is not one of identity
between the acts and decisions of the former and the wishes and views of the
latter," as would be the case in proxy representation. 192 Rather, legislators
necessarily exercise a degree of discretion independent of their constituents'
actual preferences:
What is important for the legitimacy of legislative decisions is that
legislators reconstruct from [the public's] wishes and convictions the
best possible vision of the just and well-governed polity, in which the
interests of individuals deserve a place. . . . Even where their actions
in their official capacity are in line with what their constituents happen
to believe and want, the ground for [legislators'] actions is not that
their constituents want them so to act. Rather, the ground is the more
complex idea that they think that certain wishes and convictions of
their constituents fit into a morally attractive vision of the just and
well-ordered polity. 193
According to Kyritsis, the legitimacy ofthe legislative process depends upon
legislators deliberating collectively and with the public to develop laws that
promote the public interest. 194 This fiduciary conception of the legislatorconstituent relationship captures how legislators actually behave, and ought
to behave, in a polity characterized by malleable preferences and pervasive
disengagement from the political process. 195

189. /d.; see also Adler, supra note 23, at 879 n.334 (noting the tension in democratic theory
between the president as "trustee" and "delegate").
190. Kyritsis, supra note 188, at 743.
191. /d. at 744-45.
192. /d.; see also Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1272 (observing that in one study "less than
twenty percent of survey respondents could identify a single vote by their representative in the
House over the preceding two years").
193. Kyritsis, supra note 188, at 743; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (discerning in the Constitution an "unmistakable expression
of a determination that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and
deliberative process").
194. See Kyritsis, supra note 188, at 743 (explaining that the legitimacy of legislative decisions
sterns from both the public's wants and the legislator's personal interpretation of how those wants
will best be satisfied).
195. The fiduciary account helps to explain how elected representatives may be understood to
represent the public as a whole rather than simply the plurality of voters who elected them.
Elections respect individuals' moral dignity as free and equal beneficiaries of state power by
offering an opportunity to participate in the constitutive process of governance, but elections are not
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The fiduciary conception of popular representation is particularly wellsuited to agency lawmaking in the modem administrative state. 196 When
Congress entrusts administrative authority to administrative agencies, it tasks
federal regulators with serving the interests of their designated statutory
beneficiaries. Agencies necessarily exercise discretion in rulemaking because Congress lacks the time and resources to explore all of the potential
ramifications of its general delegations. 197 The entrustment of discretionary
lawmaking power to administrative agencies therefore engenders a relationship in which the public depends upon federal regulators to employ their
discretionary powers in the public interest and stands in a position of acute
vulnerability to the abuse of administrative power. Moreover, as in the legislative process, most voters do not monitor agency activities closely and
lack coherent, informed preferences concerning administrative lawmaking. 198
Just as constituents rely on their legislative representatives to educate them
about lawmaking initiatives and act in their interest, the electorate likewise
relies on administrative agencies to bring their expertise to bear in studying
regulatory problems, to educate the public on the stakes of regulation, and
ultimately to employ their rulemaking powers fairly and reasonably in
furtherance of the general public welfare. 199
To ensure that administrative lawmaking honors the moral dignity of
individual subjects, the fiduciary principle demands that agencies employ a
decision-making process that respects all persons as free and equal autonomous agents. In this respect, the fiduciary model closely resembles Henry
Richardson's idea of democratic autonomy, which emphasizes public
participation in "collective reasoning about public ends, the ends of

an "infallible normative touchstone." RICHARDSON, supra note 165, at 58-59, 60. As Henry
Richardson has observed, majoritarian domination may be just as great a threat to individual
freedom as bureaucratic domination, unless it is "constrained to operate within fair procedures that
respect persons as free and equals and provide adequate protection for their fundamental rights and
liberties." !d. at 47.
196. See generally Criddle, supra note 35, at 135-72 ("Fiduciary law's core elements of
entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duty increasingly capture the 'deep structure' of
administrative law."); ABA Comm. on Gov't Standards, Keeping Faith: Government Ethics &
Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 287, 291-92 (1993) (characterizing government
as a "fiduciary, or steward, ... to whom power is given in order that his knowledge and skill can be
brought to bear for the benefit of another" and emphasizing "the entrusting of power by 'We, the
People' to those who govern for us").
197. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State,
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 109 (2000) (explaining that the public delegates power to legislators because
members of the public generally lack the time or expertise to make informed policy choices, and
legislators likewise delegate decision-making power to administrative agencies due to a lack of time
and insufficient knowledge of particular areas oflaw).
198. See id. at 106-07 (developing a public-choice theory of administrative lawmaking based
upon similar premises).
199. See id. at 118 ("[W]hat counts is not agency adherence to congressional wishes; rather, the
agency has an incentive to do a good job in order to please the principal's principal-the public.");
cf RICHARDSON, supra note 165, at 41 (noting that reliance on another's superior knowledge or
experience can itself constitute domination).
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policy."200 Both models of the administrative state emphasize the liberal
ideals of freedom and equality, the rationalist ideal of reasoned deliberation,
and the republican ideal of inclusive deliberation as a safeguard against
domination. 201 The primary distinction between fiduciary administration and
"democratic autonomy" lies in Richardson's assertion that it is "necessary"
for "individuals [to] participate sufficiently in the political process for them
to count as deciding, together, what ought to be done." 202 While the fiduciary model supports affording the public an opportunity to participate in
agency deliberation, 203 the absence of actual public participation does not
ipso facto delegitimize agency lawmaking as impermissible domination. 204
Indeed, it is precisely the public's disengagement from the rulemaking
process-coupled with its incapacity to wield public regulatory powers and
its vulnerability to regulators' abuse of discretion-that triggers the fiduciary
principle.205 The question then becomes whether administrative law adequately mediates the state-subject fiduciary relation by channeling
administrative discretion through principles or procedures that ensure that
individual subjects are treated as free and equal autonomous persons.
C. Fiduciary Representation in Agency Rulemaking: Six Principles

To safeguard beneficiaries against domination, six principles define and
structure fiduciary representation: purposefulness, integrity, solicitude,
fairness, reasonableness, and transparency. 206 These six principles are
common to all fiduciary relations, but they have particular salience as
relational constraints on federal rulemaking powers.

200. RICHARDSON, supra note 165, at 19.
201. See id. at 242-46 (reviewing the four component ideals of democratic autonomy and
analyzing existing democracies' realization of these ideals).
202. /d. at 66.
203. See id. at 247 (arguing that the populist ideal of democracy requires that citizens
participate in all lawmaking, including agency rulemaking).
204. See Russell Hardin, Deliberation: Method, Not Theory, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS:
ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 103, 116 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999) ("Because of
the sheer size of the polity, citizens have little interest in participating and, given this fact, even less
interest in being well enough informed to participate well [in politics]. . . . [T]o hope, expect, or
wish for citizens to do much deliberating is unreasonable and forlorn.").
205 . See ABA Comm. on Gov't Standards, supra note 196, at 292 (describing citizens as
increasingly "dependent upon public employees for help in understanding, and effectively
communicating with, their government" and characterizing those entrusted with public power as
being under a duty of "Scrupulous Integrity" in order to "avoid circumstances that create the
opportunity for interest or bias to exert their corrosive influence" in discussing the requisite qualities
of ethical government service).
206. See generally Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 360-68 (discussing these principles
of fiduciary representation in the context of human rights law); Robert G. Natelson, The
Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICH. L.
REv. 191, 211-32 (2001) (comparing the Roman Emperor Trajan's form of government to what is
now thought of as a fiduciary concept of government through the lens of four "central trust
obligations").
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First, to satisfy the fiduciary model of popular representation, federal
regulators must ensure that all exercises of rulemaking authority are consistent with Congress's statutorily designated public-regarding purpose. 207
Although congressional legislative directives are often extremely broad,
expressing only vague "intelligible principles" to guide agency action, 208
these directives are binding on federal regulators in rulemaking
proceedings. 209 When specifying the directives embodied in congressional
legislation, federal regulators may not substitute their own preferred purposes
for those authoritatively designated by Congress. 210
The second and third principles of fiduciary representation-integrity
and solicitude-arise from the paradigmatic fiduciary duty of loyalty. The
principle of integrity dictates that federal regulators must refrain from exploiting their entrusted authority and the public's dependence and
vulnerability for personal or institutional self-aggrandizement. They may
not, for example, use their regulatory powers to appropriate public resources
for personal gain or expand an agency's jurisdiction without congressional
authorization. 211 Instead, regulators must act with due solicitude toward the
legitimate interests of their statutory beneficiaries, treating them as ends in
themselves and never as mere means.Z 12 Since public preferences are relevant to the public interest, solicitude obligates regulators to give reasonable
consideration to public preferences alongside other factors relevant to the
public interest. Agencies must also avoid any arbitrary delay or inaction that
could result in the squandering of valuable public resources or
opportunities. 213
Fourth, fiduciary representation obligates agencies to exercise their
rulemaking powers in a manner that is consistent with the principles of
fairness. Under the fiduciary duty of loyalty, all private parties whose legal
or practical interests are dependent upon and vulnerable to federal

207. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) ("[T]he exercise of quasilegislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such
power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes."); Stark v. Wickard, 321
U.S. 288, 309 (1944) ("When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry
on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted.").
208. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,472 (2001).
209. See Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302 (noting that quasi-legislative authority is subject to the
limitations that Congress imposes).
210. See id. at 306-08 (holding that in order for a regulation to have the force oflaw, it must be
reasonably contemplated by the statutory grant of authority).
211. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (holding that the Controlled
Substances Act does not authorize the Attorney General to regulate physician-assisted suicide).
212. Cf GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 543, at 217 (2d ed. rev. 1993) (describing a trustee's duty of loyalty as complete
loyalty to beneficiaries' interests and ignorance of any selfish interests).
213. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 92 (2007) (describing the initial duty of a trustee
to review and revise investments within a "reasonable time"); id. at cmt. b ("[A] trustee may be held
liable for losses resulted from imprudently retaining trust property or from unreasonably delaying
its sale.").
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rulemaking powers are co-equal beneficiaries of state legal authority. As
such, federal regulators may not disregard the interests of any person whose
interests may be affected by a proposed rulemaking action, and their final
rule must treat similarly situated persons alike. Fiduciaries must accord "due
214
regard" to each and every beneficiary's respective interests.
Fifth, federal regulators as fiduciaries must accord their beneficiaries
due respect by exercising their rulemaking powers reasonably. As in private
fiduciary law, federal regulators must employ "proper safeguards and
internal procedures" and consider "the advice of specialists or experts where
necessary to make informed decisions." 215 Fiduciary representation requires
a thorough investigation of regulatory problems, obligating regulators to
gather relevant information, consider advice and criticism from interested
parties, solicit input from experts, and rationally assess the merits of alternative policies. Once regulators settle upon a proposed course of action, they
must provide a reasoned justification for their chosen policy. In short, the
fiduciary model dictates that federal regulation must bear the same hallmarks
of deliberative rationality that characterize fiduciary representation in ordinary private law settings.
Sixth, the fiduciary model of popular representation requires federal
regulators to act transparently, opening records and communications to
public inspection upon request in order to facilitate effective monitoring of
the principles of purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, and
reasonableness. It is conceivable, of course, that federal regulators could
satisfy their primary fiduciary obligations of purposefulness, integrity,
solicitude, fairness, and reasonableness without transparency. In the absence
of transparency, however, the beneficiaries of federal regulation would be
unable to discover many breaches of duty, rendering the other principles of
fiduciary representation ineffectual and thereby subjecting beneficiaries to
intolerable vulnerability. Transparency is ordinarily necessary, therefore, to
ensure that administrative agencies perform their fiduciary role faithfully.
Where agencies seek to deviate from the transparency norm, they must furnish reasoned justifications that are consistent with their other fiduciary
obligations of purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, and
reasonableness.
Few if any of these six principles of fiduciary representation would play
a central role in the majoritarian proxy model of popular representation. As
long as a federal regulation enjoyed the support of a public majority, it would
make little difference under the proxy model whether the regulation comported with Congress's purposes, whether it arbitrarily discriminated against
rival classes of beneficiaries, or whether it reflected rational deliberation
conducive to informed decision making. In contrast, the fiduciary model

214. /d.§79.
215 . BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 541, at 171.
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insists that each of these principles is critical to achieve meaningful popular
representation in the modem administrative state. These six principles of
public fiduciary obligation are relational constraints that the rule of law
places on public officials' exercise of administrative powers.Z 16

D. Fiduciary Representation in Agency Rulemaking: Three Applications
To what extent does federal administrative law currently promote
fiduciary representation in agency rulemaking? The results are mixed, to be
sure. The APA's notice-and-comment procedures for informal rulemaking
arguably advance fiduciary representation by encouraging federal agencies to
act fairly, reasonably, and transparently. 217 So, too, do the APA's requirements for formal rulemaking, which permit agencies to promulgate
regulations only at the close of a trial-type evidentiary hearing. 218 The
Freedom of Information Act (FOIAi 19 and Federal Advisory Committee Act
(F ACAi 20 likewise promote transparency by facilitating public access to a
range of documents and communications relevant to agency rulemaking. 221
These procedural requirements are steps in the right direction, though they
are hardly sufficient to realize fiduciary representation in federal rulemaking.
While an exhaustive discussion of the fiduciary model's implications
for federal rulemaking lies beyond the scope of this Article, a few examples
of the fiduciary model's potential applications to administrative rulemaking
may help to illustrate the model's practical value. Specifically, Congress
could harmonize the AP A's general rulemaking procedures with the fiduciary model of the administrative state by: (1) recalibrating the APA's
exceptions for informal notice-and-comment rulemaking, (2) expanding judicial review of agency inaction in rulemaking, and (3) mandating disclosure
of communications between agencies and the White House related to agency
rulemaking. 222

216. See Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 271-72 (characterizing the "fiduciary duty" of the
government as simultaneously justifying and defining the boundaries of governmental action).
217. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006) (specifying, respectively, requirements for notice to and
participation of interested parties in proposed rules).
218. !d. §§ 556-557.
219. !d.§ 552.
220. !d. app. §§ 1-16.
221. See id. § 552(a)(2) (mandating agency publication of decisions made in adjudication,
certain "statements of policy and interpretations," and "manuals and instructions to staff that affect
a member of the public"); id. app. §§ 10--11 (requiring advisory committee meetings be open to the
public and that certain written records, including transcripts, of such meetings be made available to
the public).
222. Versions of these proposals have been articulated elsewhere in the literature on federal
rulemaking, and it is not my purpose to elaborate the policy arguments for and against these
proposals with all of the nuance and sophistication that others have devoted to them. Instead, my
aim is simply to illustrate how the fiduciary model illuminates a new path toward popular
representation in agency rulemaking.
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1. Eliminate the APA 's Categorical Exemptions for Informal
Rulemaking.-An important first step in reforming federal rulemaking
procedure would be to extend the fiduciary model's general principles of deliberative decision making to all forms of agency rulemaking.
Currently, the APA divides agency rulemaking into three broad
categories: substantive rules (or "legislative rules"), interpretive rules, and
procedural rules. 223 Substantive rules generate legal obligations, altering
people's existing rights and obligations pursuant to statutory authority. 224
Procedural rules also command the force of law, prescribing the procedures
an agency will employ in carrying out its administrative functions. 225
Interpretive rules, which "express an agency's intended course of action or
its view of the meaning of a statute or regulation," are not formally
binding. 226 The classification of a particular rule as substantive, interpretive,
or procedural has important consequences: while the AP A requires agencies
to publish all three types of rules, 227 only the first category-legislative
rules-are subject to the APA's full notice-and-comment procedural
requirements. 228
The problem with exempting interpretive and procedural rules from the
AP A notice-and-comment procedures is that both categories can have a
significant impact on private interests and obligations. Interpretive rules, for
example, may profoundly influence agency enforcement practices and judicial statutory interpretation. 229 Similarly, procedural rules may restrict the
opportunities for regulated parties or beneficiaries to defend their interests in
agency adjudicatory proceedings. 230 No matter what type of rules an agency
adopts, the fiduciary model dictates that the agency should be prepared to

223. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(l) (differentiating publication deadlines for substantive and
interpretive rules); Clary v. United States, 85 F.3d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996) (recognizing an APA
distinction between "legislative" and interpretive rules).
224. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, § 4.8, at 181.
225. !d. at 180.
226. !d. at 181.
227. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
228. !d. § 553(b)(3)(A).
229. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001) (holding that customsrevenue letters, while not having the force oflaw, "may merit some deference whatever its form");
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (affirming the Court's historic recognition of
Treasury interpretative decisions as having "considerable and in some cases decisive weight");
Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L.
REv. 397, 40{}-{)1 (2007) (noting that agency-guidance documents are often treated as having the
force of law by parties subject to the regulation, since to behave otherwise would require parties to
accept the expense and risks of challenging the interpretation in court).
230. See 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE§ 5.13 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing administrative agencies' wide discretion in structuring hearings including, in some
cases, the authority to issue rules dispensing with formal adjudication of any kind).
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explain how its rules are fair, reasonable, purposive, and public regarding. 231
In its current form, the AP A does not satisfy these basic principles.
Equally disconcerting, the APA does not even require deliberative
decision making for many categories of legislative rules. The AP A expressly
excludes from its coverage any legislative rules that address military or foreign affairs functions, 232 rules governing agency management or personnel, 233
and rules related to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." 234
These exceptions to the APA's ordinary rulemaking categories have been
widely criticized as overinclusive 235-relics of an earlier era's misguided
commitment to the rights/privileges distinction236-yet Congress has not
fully implemented recommendations for refonn. 237 Agencies are always free
to employ more robust deliberative procedures than those required under the
APA, 238 but in practice they do not always engage in open public deliberation
over rules that fall within these categories. 239 As a result, the AP A does not
ensure that agencies satisfy their fiduciary obligations in these contexts.
Agencies may decline to employ notice-and-comment procedures even when
these procedures are self-evidently necessary, practicable, and in the public
interest. 240 These loopholes in agency notice-and-comment rulemaking
should be closed to promote purposeful, reasonable, and transparent
rulemaking.

231. Jessica Mantel has employed a similar "trustee" theory to advocate enhanced procedural
requirements for agency guidance statements. See Mantel, supra note 56, at 364-65 (arguing that
administrative procedures should "promote adherence" to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
obedience to the law).
232. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(l).
233. ld. § 553(a)(2).
234. ld.
235. See Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.69-8 ( 1974) (detailing § 553(a)(2) rules pertaining to "public property, loans, grants, benefits,
or contracts"); Elimination of the "Military or Foreign Affairs Function" Exemption from AP A
Rulemaking Requirements, I C.F.R. § 305.73-5 (1975) (detailing§ 553(a)(l)). The Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) adopted recommendations, which were published in the
Federal Register, then compiled in § 305 of the C.F.R. The ACUS was terminated in 1996, and
§ 305 was accordingly removed from the C.F.R. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, Military and Foreign
Affairs Function Rulemaking Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 221,238 (1972) (arguing that while
a narrow construction would be preferable, the language of the "military or foreign affairs function"
exemption is nevertheless "very broad").
236. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, § 4.12, at 197 (contending that there is no justification to
maintain the exclusions).
237. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 48-49 (3d ed.
1998) (discussing Congress's piecemeal efforts to broaden notice-and-comment procedures for
particular agencies).
238. See The Procedural and Practice Rule Exemption from the APA Notice-and-Comment
Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-1 (1993) (recommending that agencies voluntarily
use notice-and-comment procedures for most procedural rules).
239. Bonfield, supra note 235, at 232.
240. See LUBBERS, supra note 237, at 46-47 (discussing the § 553 exemptions and noting that,
because they involve important governmental functions, they have been strongly criticized).

HeinOnline -- 88 Tex. L. Rev. 481 2009-2010

482

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 88:441

To be sure, the fiduciary model does not necessarily require notice-andcomment procedures for all rulemaking initiatives. To borrow Justice
Robert H. Jackson's colorful expression, fiduciary representation is not a
"suicide pact,"241 nor need it be a prescription for paralysis by analysis.
Federal agencies might reasonably dispense with notice-and-comment
procedures where the cost, inconvenience, or delay attending such procedures would be "unnecessary" or "impracticable." 242 On the other hand, the
fiduciary model cannot approve agencies adopting regulations that would
materially impact the public interest without satisfying the fundamental principles of fairness, reasonableness, and solicitude. Whatever form agency
rulemaking might take, agencies must employ a robust deliberative process
supported by rational reason giving.

2. Expand Judicial Review of Agency Inaction-Second, Congress
should expand judicial review of agency inaction to ensure agencies' fidelity
to congressional purposes. For many critics, the most frustrating characteristic of presidential administration is its perceived tendency to enervate
agency rulemaking. 243 Rather than spurring agencies to action, White House
officials have been accused of exploiting their political influence behind the
scenes to delay or block disfavored rulemaking initiatives?44 Such criticisms
dogged the Bush Administration, for instance, in fields such as environmental protection and occupational health and safety. 245
Whether agency inaction and delay should be viewed as cause for alarm
will depend, of course, upon whether one accepts the proxy model or the fiduciary model of popular representation. Under the proxy model, the White
House's decision to stay an agency rulemaking proposal could be perceived
as a pro-majoritarian check on countermajoritarian bureaucratic decision
making. 246 Conversely, under the fiduciary model, agency delay and inaction

241. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
242. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2006). Indeed, the fiduciary model arguably militates against
notice-and-comment rulemaking where the resources required would be so grossly disproportionate
to the particular issue presented as to be "contrary to the public interest." !d. Under the fiduciary
model, however, an agency's determination that there is "good cause" to depart from notice-andcomment procedures would itself be subject to judicial review. See LUBBERS, supra note 237, at 76
& n.l74 (suggesting that courts may apply even heavier scrutiny to such departures).
243. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1274 ("Agencies' decisions not to regulate
can be every bit as costly to society as overly expensive regulations .... ").
244. See, e.g., Amy Goldstein & Sarah Cohen, Bush Forces a Shift in Regulatory Thntst: OSHA
Made More Business-Friendly, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2004, at AI ("Unlike his two predecessors,
Bush has canceled more of the unfinished regulatory work he inherited than he has
completed .... "); ROBERT SHULL ET AL., OMB WATCH, THE BUSH REGULATORY RECORD: A
PATTERN OF FAILURE 4 (2004), http://www.ombwatch.org/files/regs/2004/pattemoffailure/
finalreport.pdf (reviewing rulemaking initiatives withdrawn by EPA, FDA, NHTSA, and OSHA
during the first term of George W. Bush's Administration).
245. SHULL ET AL., supra note 244, at 25-32,51-57.
246. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1676--77 (2004) (noting that the "presidential control model"
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unaccompanied by a reasoned justification would pose precisely the same
risks of unfairness, unreasonableness, opportunism, and waste that arise in
proactive agency action, and both types of arbitrary agency decision making
violate agencies' basic fiduciary duties.
The AP A already specifies that agencies must "conclude a matter
presented to" them "within a reasonable time," 247 and it authorizes courts to
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. " 248 In
practice, however, federal courts have been reluctant to set aside the
President's assessment of the "reasonableness" of agency inaction or the
"reasonable" timeline for rulemaking in favor of their own independent
assessment. 249 Some courts have held that agency decisions to withhold or
delay rulemaking action are simply unreviewable. 250 Others have agreed to
consider claims based on agency inaction but have deferred all too quickly to
agencies' reasonableness assessments. 251
While some judicial deference to agency agenda setting and resource
allocation might be appropriate, the fiduciary model supports more robust
judicial review of agency inaction in the rulemaking context-whether it be
an agency's failure to initiate rulemaking, delay of ongoing rulemaking
proceedings, or the unreasonable termination of rulemaking without issuance
of a rule. The best way to make agency fiduciary duties credible in these
contexts would be to strengthen judicial review by loosening ( l) the doctrine
of nonreviewability, which limits the types of claims that may be raised
against agency inaction, and (2) the doctrine of standing, which limits the
types of parties who may bring claims based on agency inaction. 252 Professor

seeks to "reconcile agency decisionrnaking with the ultimate form of majority rule ... by relocating
agencies from the headless fourth branch to the executive branch"); Nzelibe, supra note 23, at 1265
(restating the argument "that presidential input in agency decisionrnaking constitutes a good proxy
for majoritarianism because the president is in some sense accountable to the people").
247. 5 u.s.c. § 555(b).
248. 5 u.s.c. § 706(1).
249. Bressman, supra note 246, at 168(}-82.
250. See, e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's refusal to take steps to protect a nuclear plant from terrorist
attack was unreviewable); Nat') Cong. of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 891
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (declining to review OSHA's refusal to issue field sanitation standards).
251. See, e.g., In re Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 553-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(declining to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Mine Safety and Health Administration to
comply with statutory timelines for rulemaking); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 797 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) ("[W]e are properly hesitant to upset an agency's priorities by ordering it to expedite one
specific action, and thus to give it precedence over others."); Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812
F.2d I, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("An agency's refusal to institute a rulemaking proceeding is at the
high end of the [deference] range."). But see In re lnt' l Chern. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144,
1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (determining that OSHA's six-year delay in issuing health standards on
workers' exposure to cadmium was unreasonable and imposing a deadline for completion).
252. See Bressman, supra note 246, at 1665 (arguing that the doctrines prevent parties from
challenging agency inaction). See generally Criddle, supra note 35, at 172-78 (comparing standing
doctrine in administrative law and private fiduciary law and arguing for broader private-citizen
standing in administrative law).
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Bressman has argued persuasively that these doctrines "relieve agencies of
the obligation to engage in reason-giving and standard-setting" by
"immuniz[ing] agency inaction from judicial review." 253 In the absence of
judicial review, it becomes "more likely that agencies will respond to private
or political pressure rather than public welfare by giving those typically
harmed by agency action (i.e., regulated entities) more power to protest than
those typically harmed by agency inaction (i.e., regulatory beneficiaries)."254
The solution to these factionalist pressures, she asserts, is to impose a requirement of deliberative reason giving for agency inaction comparable to
the reason-giving requirements for agency action.255 Protracted delays in
rulemaking proceedings should be accompanied by a "reasoned explanation"
of the grounds and purpose for delaying promulgation of an anticipated rule,
and this statement should be subject to some form of judicial review,
however deferential. 256 As Bressman observes, "enforcing the requirements
of reason-giving and standard-setting ... will promote the conditions that
prevent, or at least minimize, corrupting influences from pervading
administrative ... decision-making." 257 The fiduciary model thus favors
promoting deliberative rationality in agency rulemaking through mandatory
reason-giving requirements backed by judicial review.
Fiduciary administration does not necessarily require more extensive
federal regulation. What is essential, as the Supreme Court recognized in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 258 is for agencies to provide rational justifications for
inaction that are consistent with their statutory mandates and the factual record before the agency. 259 At present, the absence of statutory reason-giving
requirements for agency inaction, coupled with the federal judiciary's
traditionally begrudging nonreviewability and standing doctrines, allows
federal agencies to deny rulemaking requests without providing any rational
justification whatsoever. 260 Such arbitrary behavior is inconsistent with the
fiduciary character of public administrative power.
3. Include White House Communications in the Administrative
Record.-To ensure that White House policy guidance enhances fiduciary
administration, Congress should require agencies to disclose communications
253. Bressman, supra note 246, at 1691.
254. !d. at 1692; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
157, 157-59 (1996) (presenting a similar proposal for judicial review of agency inaction).
255. The APA requires agencies to "incorporate in the rules adopted a concise statement of
their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
256. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007); see also id. at 527-28 ("Refusals to
promulgate rules are ... susceptible to judicial review, though such review is 'extremely limited'
and 'highly deferential."' (quoting Nat'! Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am., Inc. v.
United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).
257 . Bressman, supra note 246, at 1693.
258. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
259. !d. at 534.
260. Bressman, supra note 246, at 1665.
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between the White House and agency personnel regarding pending
Currently, the APA forbids ex parte
rulemaking proceedings. 261
communications only in formal rulemaking proceedings, turning a blind eye
to ex parte communications arising in ordinary notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 262 President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12,866 mandates
some public disclosure of documents exchanged between agencies and
OIRA, but it does not address communications between agencies and other
White House offices. 263 Justice Scalia and various other commentators have
defended the exclusion of White House communications from the public record in whole or in part, arguing that this approach facilitates candid dialogue
on important policy questions. 264
Fiduciary administration, in contrast, favors mandatory disclosure for
nearly all White House communications with agencies related to pending
rulemaking actions-irrespective of whether the communications convey
factual information or policy advice. While a rulemaking proposal is
pending, all ex parte contacts related to the proposal-including
communications with the White House-should be prohibited. 265 If the
President, his staff, or other federal agencies wish to offer guidance on a
pending rulemaking proposal, Congress should require that they do so on the
record during the agency's public comment period. 266 These reforms would
channel the White House's policy guidance into the public sphere where it
could bolster, rather than undermine, fiduciary administration.

261. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decision Making,
36 AM. U. L. REv. 443, 451-62 (1987) (criticizing the President's role in agency regulation,
especially with undisclosed interventions).
262. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(a), 557(d)(l) (2006).
263. Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 6(a)(3)(E), (b)(4), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646-47 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
264. See, e.g., Intragovernmental Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, I
C.F.R. § 305.80-6 (1981) (recommending a distinction between factual information and policy
advice, and arguing for disclosure only of the former); see also, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Two Wrongs
Make a Right: The Judicialization ofStandardless Rulemaking, REG., July-Aug. 1977, 38, at 40--41
(discussing the benefits of frank and informal conversation off the record in the rulemaking
process).
265. See I PIERCE, supra note 13, § 7.9, at 356 (arguing that Congress could forbid agencies
from engaging in ex parte contacts with the White House during rulemaking). Exceptions might be
warranted for communications in highly sensitive fields such as national security, but in such cases
the fiduciary model would support a requirement that agencies furnish a reasonable justification for
withholding disclosure.
266. See Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking, I C.F.R. § 305.88-9 (1991)
(recommending disclosure of conduit communications); LUBBERS, supra note 237, at 27 n.l30
(discussing the ABA's endorsement of "Recommendation 88-9 in its entirety"); NAT'L ACAD. OF
PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING IN REGULATORY AGENCIES 35
( 1987) (arguing that maintenance of a written record will provide precedent and reduce the need for
judicial review); McGarity, supra note 261, at 462 (acknowledging that the President has a
legitimate role in establishing policy but stressing that presidential participation, nonetheless, should
be open to public scrutiny).
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At the close of agency rulemaking proceedings, White House
communications should be included in the administrative record for judicial
review. Requiring full disclosure and judicial review of communications
between White House officials and agency officials would serve several
salutary purposes. First, this approach would render the White House's
influence over agency rulemaking more accessible to public scrutiny,
reinforcing the President's electoral accountability. Second, setting aside its
proverbial disinfectant properties, transparency would promote greater policy
coordination among the White House's internal offices, ameliorating the internal conflicts reported by Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh. 267 The
disclosure of White House communications would also enable federal courts
to reinforce agency fiduciary representation more effectively through judicial
review of agency rulemaking? 68 If agencies were to rely on White House
information or policy guidance, courts conducting hard look review could
consider these communications alongside other material in the administrative
record such as the agency's own expert reports and comments from private
parties. Where agencies unreasonably disregard warnings about potential
interagency policy conflicts, courts might strike down agency regulations as
"arbitrary" and "capricious" under the AP A. 269 Conversely, federal regulations might be considered arbitrary and capricious where agencies rely on
White House directives unreasonably to the neglect of important scientific
facts or expert judgments. In short, we might reasonably expect greater
White House transparency to enhance agency deliberation while reducing the
risk of arbitrary political jawboning and interest-group capture.
Executive privilege does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the
disclosure of White House communications with agency officials. In
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 270 the Supreme Court declared that
"[t]he authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of
executive control cannot well be doubted." 271 Relying on this basic principle,
lower courts have preserved the APA's prohibition on ex parte communications against constitutional challenge in the context of White House
intervention into formal agency adjudication. 272 Under the reasoning of

267. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 121, at 49 (discussing internal conflicts
resulting from the influence of multiple offices in the rulemaking process).
268. See McGarity, supra note 261, at 461--{)2 (arguing that judicial review becomes "an
elaborate and expensive charade" if agencies can base their decisions on "secret communications
with the President or his staft").
269. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); see also Strauss, supra note 62, at 736 (noting anecdotally
that agency administrators would occasionally "tell the President to pound sand" when "the
President knew they had the political capital to win").
270. 295 u.s. 602 (1935).
271. !d. at 629.
272. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1546
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding the APA's ex parte communication prohibition applicable to the
Endangered Species Committee, the President, and the White House staft).
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Humphrey's Executor and its progeny, there would seem to be no compelling
reason why Congress could not also proscribe ex parte communications
between the White House and agency administrators in informal rulemaking.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed this implication of
Humphrey's Executor in Portland Audubon Society v. Endangered Species
Committee. 273 Taking up the banner of presidential administration, the first
Bush Administration argued that the APA's restriction on ex parte communications unconstitutionally undermined the President's authority to instruct
and guide inferior executive officers. 274 The Ninth Circuit "reject[ed] this
argument out of hand," however, emphasizing the "fundamental precept of
administrative law that when an agency performs a quasi-judicial (or quasilegislative) function its independence must be protected."275 The court
recognized that although executive privilege might protect certain internal
White House communications from public disclosure, it did not preclude
Congress from proscribing ex parte White House communications with
agency officials in the course of informal rulemaking proceedings. 276
Those who view the President as an effective proxy for popular
preferences will likely contest my argument that White House policy
guidance merits hard look judicial review. If presidents are better suited than
federal judges to determine whether federal regulations comport with majoritarian preferences, a plausible argument could be made that federal law
should not authorize judges to second-guess presidential policy guidance.
On the other hand, if (as I have argued) majoritarian preferences are largely
illusory in the administrative state and White House regulatory review remains an unreliable proxy, hard look judicial review might well be the best
available vehicle for promoting fiduciary representation in agency
rulemaking. 277
E. Fiduciary Representation and Popular Sovereignty
As these examples illustrate, the fiduciary model of state legal authority
furnishes a credible framework for honoring popular sovereignty and
promoting popular representation in the modern administrative state. The
fiduciary model responds to Bickel's basic concern about the need for

273. 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993). But see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,408 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (holding that in the absence of further congressional action, neither the Clean Air Act nor due
process require disclosure of all presidential communications with agencies during informal
rulemaking).
274. Portland Audubon Soc'y, 984 F.2d at 1546.
275. !d.
276. See id. (analyzing whether Congress proscribing ex parte White House communications
with agency officials interfered with a presidential prerogative).
277. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency PolicyMaking, 80 IOWA L. REV. I, 24 (1994) ("Judicial review may encourage deliberative decisionmaking aimed at the public interest by delineating statutory goals in terms of some public-regarding
purposes.").
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popular representation in federal lawmaking, but it also confronts and
addresses the obvious blind spots in his conception of popular representation.
If the public lacks discrete preferences on questions of regulatory policy, and
if broader public preferences (to the extent they exist) are malleable and dictated in large part by the public's dynamic interaction with state institutions,
then the majoritarian argument for presidential administration loses much of
its force. 278 Shedding Bickel's dubious preoccupation with majoritarianism,
the fiduciary model acknowledges the inevitability and indispensability of
administrative discretion in a republican democrac/ 79 and instead emphasizes institutional fidelity, as measured against the principles of
purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and
transparency. These principles of fiduciary representation circumscribe the
outer limits of administrative discretion in agency rulemaking, underscoring
the fiduciary responsibilities that the public entrusts to their elected and appointed representatives throughout the administrative state.
Fiduciary representation bears certain affinities to civic-republican and
deliberative-democracy theories of the administrative state insofar as its
principles of integrity, solicitude, fairness, and reasonableness invite public
officials to engage in reflective deliberation on the common good. 280 Each of
these theories emphasizes substantive values and processes that should inform state decision making, including whether regulators honor
congressional purpose, engage diverse perspectives, and provide rational
justifications for their decisions. 281 Fiduciary representation is distinguishable from some strains of deliberative-democracy theory, however, because it
does not treat the public's engagement in agency deliberation as an end in
itself, nor does it rely upon the deliberative process to produce a legitimating
social consensus. 282
Instead, fiduciary representation views agency
278. See Somin, supra note 101, at 1292 (suggesting that legislative output does not represent
majoritarian will if the electorate is ill-informed about politics and government policy).
279. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("Congress simply cannot do its
job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.").
280. See PITKIN, supra note 141, at 163-65 (arguing that representatives should do what is in
their constituents' best interests and must explain and reconsider their views when they differ from
the constituents' wishes); id. at 193 (noting that Madison believed the purpose of a well-ordered
government was to promote deliberation over the common good); Mantel, supra note 56, at 369
(reviewing applications of civic-republican theory to administrative governance); Mark Seidenfeld,
A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1528 (1992)
(linking this deliberative process of agency decision making to the civic-republican tradition, which
emphasizes "the public good" rather than "majority rule"); Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1278-94
(developing a deliberative-democracy theory of governmental accountability).
281. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3-4
(2004) (arguing that the most fundamental purpose of deliberative democracy is to require
representatives and citizens to justify their decisions); Seidenfeld, supra note 280, at 1531-32
("[T]o be legitimate, a decision must respect the positions of all interest groups and respond to their
arguments in terms of the good of the community.").
282. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 281, at 21-23 (debating whether deliberative
democracy is useful just as a means of arriving at good policies or whether it also manifests mutual
respect between citizens and representatives); Seidenfeld, supra note 280, at 1534 (noting that civic
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deliberation and transparency as principles that are necessary (albeit not
sufficient) to ensure that discretionary agency lawmaking promotes the public welfare. The fiduciary model recognizes that public engagement in
agency deliberation may help to clarify the stakes of regulation, but public
disengagement and disharmony do not necessarily eviscerate the legitimacy
of administrative action. 283 Under the fiduciary model, the process-oriented
values of administrative governance are simply "a means to enforce the trust
placed in representatives," not a panacea for political discord or regulatory
malaise. 284
To some, the fiduciary model might appear uncomfortably close to
Burke's much-maligned theory that all government institutions serve as
"trustees for the people."285 Burke invoked the fiduciary concept as support
for the argument that public authority ought to reside in a "natural
aristocracy"-namely, men of superior skills and ability who would be best
equipped to discern the national interest through reasoned deliberation. 286
This vision of the trusteeship state has been criticized as lending a false
veneer of political legitimacy to aristocratic oligarchy and colonial
imperialism. 287 "Burke could regard all government as a trusteeship," writes
one critic, because under his theory of representation "no democratic
implication need be involved, nor are elections necessary." 288
While it is true that Burke's trusteeship model and the fiduciary model
of the state spring from a common intellectual tradition, the facial similarities
between the two conceptions of popular representation run mostly skin deep.
Unlike Burkean trusteeship, the fiduciary model of state legal authority is
grounded in popular sovereignty and honors the public's prerogative to shape
government institutions, participate in government policy formation, require
government officials to provide fair, reasonable, and other-regarding
justifications for their actions, and seek the removal of incompetent or

republicanism "insist[s) that government actions reflect social consensus about the common good");
cf ELY, supra note 2, at 87 (arguing that judicial review should be "participation-oriented"). But
see Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
263, 263-64 (2009) (arguing that deliberation may exacerbate group polarization rather than
generate consensus).
283. Were this not so, virtually no state action could be considered legitimate.
284. Brown, supra note 3, at 565.
285. See BURKE, supra note 137, at 28 ("The king is the representative of the people; so are the
lords; so are the judges. They all are trustees for the people .... ").
286. EDMUND BURKE, The French Revolution, in BURKE'S POLITICS, supra note 137, at 277,
397-98.
287. See, e.g., David Bromwich, Introduction to EDMUND BURKE, ON EMPIRE, LIBERTY, AND
REFORM : SPEECHES AND LETTERS I, 35 (David Bromwich ed., 2000) (contending that Burke
believed there should be a ruling elite composed of a natural aristocracy); GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
supra note 281, at 8 (criticizing Burke's trustee theory as "more aristocratic than democratic");
JAMES HOGAN, ELECTION AND REPRESENTATION 157 (1945) (describing Burke as "the last and
greatest champion of parliamentary oligarchy ... protesting against the notion of a democratic
franchise").
288. PITKlN, supra note 141, at 129.
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unprincipled government officers. 289 The fiduciary model also provides
discrete criteria for evaluating the performance of public officials in their
roles as representatives. 290 Moreover, the fiduciary model does not authorize
public officials to disregard the general will of the people entirely. Because
individual dignity entails freedom to define one's own ends, public preferences are always a relevant and important factor when public officials
consider how best to promote the public welfare, and such preferences merit
serious consideration within the deliberative processes of public
lawmaking. 291 Whatever path regulators choose, they must be prepared to
furnish a reasonable explanation for their decision that responds to opposing
viewpoints. 292 Thus, far from undermining democratic governance, the fiduciary conception of popular representation should facilitate transparency,
rationality, consensus building, and political accountability. 293
Others might argue that the concept of fiduciary obligation in
administrative law is incoherent because concepts such as the public welfare
and the common good are subject to a range of interpretations and may be
radically indeterminate at the margins. Even if all could agree that administrative agencies bear a fiduciary obligation to promote the public welfare,
this notional consensus might be of little value if the public welfare itself remains a fundamentally contested concept. To be sure, Congress has a role to
play in defining the public welfare by providing intelligible principles to
guide agency lawmaking. But these principles are often pitched at such a
high level of generality that agencies are left with broad discretion to clarify
both the nature of the task at hand and the best tools for accomplishing the
task. 294 As a result, administrative agencies often enjoy sweeping policy-

289. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 351-52 (comparing Burke's theory of
colonial trusteeship, which denies the ability of colonized peoples to govern themselves, with the
postcolonial fiduciary theory, which emphasizes popular sovereignty).
290. /d.
291. See PITKIN, supra note 141, at 161 ("Surely sometimes we can promote a person's welfare
even against his wishes; yet we would not want to say in general that people's wishes are irrelevant
to a definition of their welfare."); cf Representative Edmund Burke, British Parliament, Speech at
the Conclusion of the Poll (Nov. 3, 1774), in 2 THE WORKS OF THE RlGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND
BURKE 9, 15 (Henry G. Bohn ed., 1854) ("Your representative owes you ... his judgment; and he
betrays, instead of serving you, ifhe sacrifices it to your opinion.").
292. See PITKIN, supra note 141, at 163-64 ("(W)hen a representative finds himself in conflict
with his constituents' wishes, this fact must give him pause. It calls for a consideration of the
reasons for the discrepancy . . . . Acting contrary to their wishes is not necessarily wrong, not
necessarily bad representation or in violation of a representative's duty. It may, indeed, be required
of him in certain situations. But it is abnormal in the sense that it calls for explanation or
justification."); see also Mashaw, supra note 168, at 118 ("Reason giving . .. treats persons as
rational moral agents who are entitled to evaluate and participate in a dialogue about official
policies on the basis of reasoned discussion. It affmns the individual as subject rather than object of
the law . . .. Authority without reason is literally dehumanizing.").
293 . Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1279-84 (discussing these four virtues of reason giving).
294. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472, 475 (2001) (observing that
although "Congress must 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle'" for agencies to
follow, the Supreme Court has "never demanded . .. that statutes provide a 'determinate criterion'"
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making discretion as they arbitrate between competing public preferences or
conceptions of the common good. 295
To be clear, fiduciary representation does not aspire to furnish a
comprehensive theory of the public welfare, nor does its force depend upon
any such theory. The fiduciary model simply recognizes the brute fact that
the law necessarily entrusts policy-making discretion to administrative
agencies, and it seeks to constrain particular exercises of administrative
discretion within acceptable bounds. After satisfying the basic principles of
fiduciary administration, regulators may find that they still enjoy substantial
discretion to determine what policy alternative will best advance Congress's
general purposes and promote the broader public welfare. Whether particular
delegations of lawmaking authority to administrative agencies are appropriate remains a political question for Congress to work out in deliberation with
the public, subject only to constitutional constraints. To the extent that
Congress chooses to entrust discretionary lawmaking authority to
administrative agencies, however, the fiduciary model suggests that such acts
of entrustment are not necessarily inconsistent with popular sovereignty,
provided that agencies respect the fiduciary character of their entrusted
authority.
V.

Fiduciary Administration

Viewed from the fiduciary model's perspective, the administrative state
comes into focus as an intricate network of nested fiduciary relations.
Presidents, legislators, judges, administrators, and other public officials serve
as fiduciary representatives for their beneficiaries, the people subject to their
entrusted administrative powers.
Keeping this broad view of the fiduciary character of state legal
authority in mind, this Part returns to the problem presented in Part 11-the
rise of presidential control over agency rulemaking-and considers what, if
anything, the fiduciary conception of popular representation might tell us
about the President's representative role in federal administrative lawmaking.
While the conclusions presented in this discussion are necessarily provisional
and highlight the need for further empirical investigation, the fiduciary model
at the very least calls into question the desirability of presidential administration as a strategy for promoting popular representation in agency rulemaking.
Rather than staying the current course toward full-fledged presidential
administration, I argue that the White House could promote popular
representation more effectively by observing certain "passive virtues" of
prudential abstention and deference in its interaction with agency regulators.

to constrain agency discretion (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
409 ( 1928))).
295. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE
OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 48 ( 1998) (describing the "pluralistic assumption
that the best political outcomes would arise as a result of group conflict").
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A. Presidents and Administrators as Fiduciary Representatives
On first impression, there would seem to be little reason for the
fiduciary model to prefer either presidents or agency administrators as the
final decision makers in administrative lawmaking. Both presidents and
agency administrators occupy positions of public trust, and both are capable
of honoring the fiduciary principles of purposefulness, integrity, solicitude,
fairness, reasonableness, and transparency. Upon closer inspection, however,
several key factors suggest that presidential administration is less likely to
advance fiduciary representation than traditional agency administration.
Consider first the question of legal entrustment, the starting point for all
fiduciary representation. Some advocates of presidential administration have
advocated presidential administration on constitutional grounds, arguing that
the Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses of Article II establish a "unitary"
Executive Branch under the President's undivided managerial contro1. 296
Others have suggested that the President's authority to direct agency
rulemaking initiatives may be inferred from more general constitutional
themes such as popular accountability or aversion to factionalism, 297 or from
implicit statutory delegations to the President. 298 However, the weight of
authority runs against these unitary-executive theories of administrative
lawmaking. The Supreme Court refuted the unitarians' theory of unfettered
presidential power to manage the Executive Branch during the late 1980s,299
and most scholarly commentary likewise rejects the argument that the
Constitution authorizes the President to direct or veto agency rulemaking in

296. See, e.g., CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note 62, at 3-4 ("[T]he theory of the unitary executive
holds that the Vesting Clause ... is a grant to the [P]resident of all the executive power, which
includes the power to remove and direct all lower-level executive officials."); Steven G. Calabresi
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-82
(1994) (arguing that the Vesting Clause of Article II confers a general and exclusive grant of power
to execute federal law); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992) (describing the
mechanisms by which the President may exert the control granted in Article II over the executive
department); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the
President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 1012-15 (1992) (arguing that the framers
designed Article II to provide for a politically accountable unitary executive to whom officers
charged with enforcement of the law would be subordinate); David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary
Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 309,
317-20 (1993) (arguing that the Vesting Clause places the totality of the executive power, which
includes the power to administrate, in the President); see also, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d
298, 405--06 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The authority of the President to control and supervise executive
policymaking is derived from the Constitution.").
297. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 102-03; Rivkin, supra note 296, at 309.
298. See Kagan, supra note 20, at 2251.
299. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410-11 (1989) (approving of the "good
cause" limitation placed by Congress on presidential removal of judges from the U.S. Sentencing
Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (holding that Congress may
constitutionally limit the Attorney General's removal power for certain officers to "good cause").

HeinOnline -- 88 Tex. L. Rev. 492 2009-2010

2010]

Fiduciary Administration

493

the absence of congressional authorization. 300 Moreover, as Kevin Stack has
shown, most agencies' enabling acts expressly commit final rulemaking authority to administrators, not the President. 301 Thus, federal law does not
appear to entrust the White House with broad managerial authority over
agency rulemaking.
To the extent that the scope of the President's legal authority remains
unclear, the six principles of fiduciary representation, which reflect persons'
moral capacity to constrain regulators' exercise of administrative discretion,
arguably militate against presidential administration. From a comparative
institutional perspective, agency administrators are generally more likely
than presidents to act purposefully, reasonably, and transparently in
rulemaking proceedings-not necessarily because they are more virtuous
than presidents but because federal administrative law compels them to do
so.302
As we have seen, the principle of purposefulness requires regulators to
respect their statutorily prescribed purposes. Presidential administration
tends to compromise the coherence of agency rulemaking by subjecting
agencies to the pressure of conflicting congressional and presidential
purposes. 303 Indeed, one reason why Congress entrusts final rulemaking

300. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 29, at 1372 (suggesting that Congress can protect some
civilian officers and department heads in the Executive Branch "from dismissal and countermand by
the President"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would
Distort and Abuse It: A Review ofThe Unitary Executive, by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher
Yoo, U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6-7, on file with Texas Law Review)
(noting an occasion on which the head of OIRA stated that the President could only compel action
from agency heads through the removal power); Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative over
Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory
of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 627,632 (1989) (noting two cases in the late
1980s in which the Supreme Court approved of congressional power over "agency structure,
location, and relationships that may properly have as its principal object the desire to limit the
President's influence over ... administration policy"); Strauss, supra note 62, at 702 (observing
that the "Constitution itself is at best ambivalent" on the question of whether the President may
micromanage agency rulemaking); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 965, 973 (1997) (arguing that an administrator removable only "for cause" has a "right, and in
some cases it may be his obligation, to refuse the President's direction, even if he realizes that his
disappointed boss may immediately send him out of office").
301. Stack, supra note 30, at 310-12; see also Percival, supra note 29, at 966 ("When Congress
enacts regulatory legislation vesting decision-making authority in agency heads, it generally
envisions that decisions will be made by persons who possess expertise in the regulatory matters
entrusted to them."). Congress might have different expectations about the President's role in some
fields of regulation that fall squarely within his constitutional war powers or foreign relations
authority.
302. See Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1306 ("[L]egislative delegations ... should be
understood as providing fmal decision-making authority to agency officials rather than to the
President, based on their superior deliberative accountability .... ").
303. Executive Order No. 12,866 states that one purpose of White House regulatory review is
to ensure that "each agency's regulatory actions are consistent with ... the President's priorities."
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 638,640 (1994); see also HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF
FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 465 (2006) (observing that
President Clinton had directed the FDA to adopt the tobacco regulation later struck down in FDA v.
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authority to agency administrators rather than to the President is to ensure
that federal regulation promotes legislative purposes (shaped deliberately
through bicameralism and presentment) rather than the President's unilateral
priorities. 304
Unlike the White House, administrative agencies are also subject to a
variety of procedural requirements that promote reasonable and transparent
administration. 305 For most agency rulemaking, federal law requires administrators to engage the public in a transparent and inclusive decision-making
process, disclosing the records and communications that informed their
decisions, and furnishing rational justifications for their rulemaking
actions. 306 When engaging in informal legislative rulemaking under the
AP A, for instance, administrative agencies must publish notice of their proposed rule, solicit public comments, and promulgate the final rule with "a
concise general statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose."307 To satisfy
judicial review, an agency must furnish a complete, contemporaneous administrative record, clarify the administrator's rationale for their decisions,
and satisfy courts that their final rule is not inconsistent with the empirical
evidence before the agency? 08 The administrator's rationale must address all
salient aspects of the problem, including the merits of other reasonable
alternatives, and justify any deviation from past rulemaking actions. 309 To
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), despite the fact that FDA lawyers had
already concluded the agency lacked the requisite statutory authorization).
304. See Kagan, supra note 20, at 2323-25 (suggesting that Congress can limit the President's
capacity to direct administrators in order to insulate administrative decision making).
305. See Criddle, supra note 35, at 151 ("Agencies are bound to exercise reasonable prudence
when exercising delegated powers, and they are forbidden from entering self-interested transactions
or arbitrarily discriminating between similarly situated beneficiaries. Courts enforce these fiduciary
duties as minimal standards of rationality, consistency, transparency, public deliberation, and
thoroughness in investigating alternatives.").
306. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 10-13 (2006) (requiring agency advisory committee meetings to be
open to the public and transcribed, and providing for disclosure of virtually all documents used in
these meetings); id. § 552 (permitting public access on request to a variety of documents and
information, including published descriptions of the agencies' methods of operations, procedures,
substantive rules, and statements of policy); id. § 552b(e)(l) (requiring agencies to give advance
public notice "of the time, place, and subject matter" of certain agency meetings).
307. ld. § 553(c).
308. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983)
(holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration had to reconsider a vehicle safety
standard because the agency failed to present an adequate basis for its decision); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59, 65 (1995) ("To
have any realistic chance of upholding a major rule on judicial review, an agency's statement of
basis and purpose now must discuss in detail each of scores of policy disputes, data disputes, and
alternatives to the rule adopted by the agency."); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 61 (1985) ("Agencies must give detailed explanations for their
decisions; justify departures from past practices; allow participation in the regulatory process by a
wide range of affected groups; and consider reasonable alternatives, explaining why they were
rejected.").
309. See INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) ("[A]n irrational departure from [a general]
policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as
'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion."'); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414,416
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the extent that agencies rely on their own expertise in rulemaking, they must
be prepared to demonstrate and defend their expert judgment during hard
look judicial review. 310 The APA thus contemplates that administrative
agencies, as public fiduciaries, will employ procedures designed to ensure
that their regulations are "the product of reasoned decisionmaking." 311 No
such procedural safeguards apply by law to the President. 312
Considerations of comparative expertise also favor vesting agency
administrators rather than presidents with final rulemaking authority.
Administrators generally possess greater experience in their fields of labor
and thus are better positioned to evaluate the public interest reasonably. 313
Administrators are also more likely to immerse themselves in the technical
details of a particular regulatory problem than presidents, whose myriad responsibilities preclude them from developing such specialized knowledge in
each and every regulatory field. 314 Administrators are therefore more likely
to act deliberately and deliberatively in approving or disapproving particular
rulemaking proposals. 315
The principle of transparency also militates strongly against presidential
administration. Under current law, the President and his staff (outside
OIRA) are not legally bound to reveal their communications with interest
groups. 316 No federal statute requires disclosure of such communications,
and the White House has often relied on executive privilege to preserve the
secrecy of its internal decision-making processes, denying observers access
to records and testimony that would facilitate public monitoring and

(D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring that the Interstate Commerce Commission explain a deviation from its
own promulgated standards).
310. See Sunstein, supra note 308, at 61 (explaining that the hard look doctrine requires that
agencies give explanations for their decisions).
311. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52; cf Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 900 (observing that a fiduciary bears the burden to
establish that he or she "has dealt candidly and fairly with" beneficiaries).
312. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1991) (holding that the President's
actions are not subject to review under the APA); Stack, supra note 30, at 318 (arguing that because
the APA does not apply to the President, implying presidential directive powers into statutes
delegating authority to agency officials may frustrate Congress's occasional interest in insulating
agencies from presidential control).
313. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1039, 1048-49 (1997) (discussing the assumption of subject-matter expertise as justifying
agency action under the "public interest" theory of administrative law).
314. See Bressman, supra note 43, at 512-13 (arguing that the President could never effectively
micromanage regulatory agencies, both for lack of expertise and time).
315. Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA.
L. REv. 271, 281-87 (1986) (characterizing administrators' role as experts who use their knowledge
of their fields to make deliberative decisions with respect to regulatory decisions).
316. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (upholding the application of
executive privilege to the Vice President's communications with members of the energy industry in
formulating energy policy).
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Similarly, White House communications with
accountability. 317
administrative agencies are not ordinarily subject to the FOIA's mandatory
disclosure requirements, 318 and the White House has resisted efforts to expose its communications with agencies to public scrutiny on grounds of
executive privilege. 319 Granted, sunshine provisions adopted during the
Clinton Administration do require OIRA to disclose contacts from private
parties during formal OIRA review, 320 and OIRA has adopted a similar
"informal practice" of disclosing such contacts on draft rules? 21 OIRA is
also required to disclose its communications with agency officials following
publication of a final rule. 322 However, these disclosure requirements do not
apply to informal OIRA communications prior to the initiation of formal
OIRA review, 323 nor do they apply to communications from any other White
House offices. 324 Hence, if the White House declines to disclose its reasons
for initiating, modifying, suspending, or terminating rulemaking initiatives,
its preferences and motivations may remain inscrutable to the electorate.
From the perspective of transparency, therefore, the fiduciary model strongly

317. See Gia B. Lee, The President"s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 197, 198-99, 203 (2008)
(arguing that executive confidentiality interferes with public accountability and the public's ability
to evaluate the government's actions).
318 . See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006) (exempting "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency"); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 n.l6 & 150 (1975) (holding that
FOIA protects presidential communications generally and materials related to intra-agency
deliberative processes); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
2004) ("There is [in FOIA) a built-in presidential communications privilege for records in the
possession of, or created by, immediate White House advisers .... ").
319. See generally Gary D. Bass & Sean Moulton, The Bush Administration's Secrecy Policy:
A Call to Action to Protect Democratic Values 3 (OMB Watch, Working Paper, 2002), available at
www.ombwatch.org/files/rtk/secrecy.pdf (discussing the Bush Administration's invocation of
executive privilege in the context of the records of President Ronald Regan, documents related to
campaign-finance investigations by Attorney General Janet Reno, and materials concerning pardons
by President Bill Clinton); MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AM. LAW DIV.,
PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 37-41 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL30319.pdf (reviewing
presidential assertions of executive privilege from Kennedy to George W. Bush).
320. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 646 ( 1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994)
(requiring agencies to Jog communications with persons outside the Executive Branch and limiting
OIRA contact with persons outside the Executive Branch).
321. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1282.
322. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. at 648.
323 . See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB'S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF
AGENCIES' DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 7-8 (2003), http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf (noting that informal OIRA review often has a substantial effect on
agency rulemaking).
324. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 648 (limiting disclosure to
those communications between OJRA and individuals outside the Executive Branch, thus
exempting disclosures from other White House offices); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 277, at 22
n.l22 ("[E]ven commentators who advocate opening OMB review via some sort of sunshine laws
focus primarily on access to communications between OMB and the regulating agency; they would
allow communications between OMB and the White House, and within the White House itself to
remain in the shadows lest deliberative discussion within the executive be chilled.").
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favors entrusting final rulemaking authority to agency administrators rather
than the popularly elected president.
Other principles of fiduciary administration-fairness, integrity, and
solicitude-pose more difficult questions. For example, are agency administrators or White House officials more likely to succumb to special-interest
capture? Which of these decision makers would be more likely to adopt
rules promoting their personal or institutional self-interest rather than acting
solely for the benefit of their statutory beneficiaries? At present, these questions lack definitive answers. While anecdotal evidence of agency capture
abounds, recent studies suggest that agency capture might actually be less
widespread and systematic than public-choice theorists once imagined. 325
Moreover, for every anecdote involving agency capture, one can point to an
equally distressing example of White House capture. 326 Pending more definitive comparative empirical findings, it remains unclear whether
administrative law would promote the principles of integrity, solicitude, and
fairness more effectively by committing final rulemaking authority to the
President or agency administrators. What we might say with some
confidence, however, is that agencies' mandatory disclosure requirements
make it far easier for the public to uncover administrators' breaches of trust
and obtain meaningful remedies through the courts. Thus, considerations of
comparative procedure-while hardly conclusive-at least cast doubt on the
idea that the President is best positioned to satisfy the fiduciary principles of
fairness, integrity, and solicitude in federal rulemaking.
In sum, the fiduciary model supports the view that Congress may
promote popular representation in the administrative state by entrusting final
rulemaking authority to agency administrators rather than the popularly
elected President. Federal administrative law promotes fiduciary representation by respecting agency administrators' statutorily entrusted authority and
holding them to deliberation-reinforcing legal requirements of
purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and
transparency. In contrast, presidential administration, as it has developed
recently under the Bush and Obama Administrations, lacks procedural safeguards sufficient to address the presidency's capacity for arbitrariness. 327
Entrusting final rulemaking authority to agency administrators thus would

325. See. e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TfERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 344 (1986) (reporting that agency capture "is not by any means the norm,
and where capture occurs, it does not always last"); Spence & Cross, supra note 197, at 121-22
("[A]gency capture is no longer regarded as a valid descriptive theory of bureaucratic behavior.").
326. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1305-{)6, 1312 (arguing that the President and
administrative agencies are similarly vulnerable to pressure from politically influential interest
groups).
327. RICHARDSON, supra note 165, at 37 ("[T]he republican ideal of freedom from
domination ... demands that the government not have the capacity to exercise power arbitrarily.").
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appear to promote the liberal ideals of fiduciary administration more
effectively than presidential administration. 328
B. Fiduciary Representation and Interbranch Deliberation

The fact that federal law generally entrusts fmal rulemaking authority to
agency administrators does not mean that the White House, Congress, and
the courts ought to remain silent in agency rulemaking proceedings.
Administrative agencies are most likely to promote the public welfare if they
develop regulations in open public deliberation with other government
institutions. As the D.C. Circuit recognized in Sierra Club v. Costle, 329 "Our
form of government simply could not function effectively or rationally if key
executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief
Executive. " 330
Advocates of presidential administration have marshaled strong
arguments for robust White House participation in the rulemaking process.
As the federal government's chief executive officer, the President has a
unique perspective on the administrative state and bears a special responsibility to ensure that federal policy reflects adequate coordination across the
administrative state. 331 The White House could help federal agencies coordinate their regulatory policies and thereby minimize interagency conflicts. In
some instances, White House policy guidance might also highlight important
national perspectives that agency officials would otherwise overlook. 332
Agency rulemaking might likewise benefit from a regular OIRA audit to ensure that administrators give proper weight to trans-substantive policy
concerns such as regulations' potential impact on the public fisc. None of
these communications would be discouraged under the fiduciary model. To
the contrary, under the principle of reasonableness, agencies would be
obliged to give careful consideration to White House guidance just as they
would information or policy guidance from any other source.
328. See Farina, supra note 99, at 1037 (arguing that the Constitution contemplates a
"multivoiced representational construct" in response to "the challenges of reflecting, and creating,
the consent of the governed"); Shane, supra note 99, at 195 (noting that the alternative to
presidential administration is political pluralism).
329. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
330. !d. at 406.
331. See, e.g., Cutler & Johnson, supra note 58, at 1410-11 ("[T]he President and his
immediate staff have an overview of government management-and a constitutional responsibility
for executing all the laws-that is not shared by a single regulatory agency, by any specialized
congressional committee or by the Congress as a whole."); Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1194-95
("If anyone is positioned to coordinate diffuse regulatory policy, it is the President, as leader of the
executive branch."); Seidenfeld, supra note 277, at l3 ("[T]he White House may be the only
governmental institution capable of successfully coordinating government policy and creating a
coherent agenda .... "); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 189 (1986) ("[T]he President is in a good position to
centralize and coordinate the regulatory process.").
332. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 121, at 89 (repeating the opinion of interview
respondents that the President can convey a broader perspective on rulemaking than agencies).
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To ensure that agencies do not arbitrarily neglect White House guidance
or other public comments, federal courts should buttress fiduciary
representation through hard look judicial review. Under the fiduciary model,
hard look judicial review serves a representation-reinforcing role analogous
to John Hart Ely's celebrated theory of judicial review. 333 The purpose of
judicial review on both accounts is to reinforce popular representation
through a "process of government" agreeable to persons of diverse ideological commitments. 334 Unlike Ely's theory of judicial review, 335 however, the
fiduciary model does not embrace process as an alternative to substantive
values. As Ely's critics have observed, "The process theme by itself
determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its
content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and
values .... "336 Instead, within the fiduciary model of popular representation,
the substantive rights and values that should guide judicial review of administrative action are made explicit. The fiduciary model rests agency
rulemaking processes on discrete substantive principles that arise from the
essential normative foundations of the state-subject fiduciary relationship:
purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and
transparency. Although these principles could conceivably demarcate a
domain of social consensus regarding good governance, their legal authority
arises from the fiduciary principle itself, not from any actual or notional
consensus.
To be clear, the fiduciary model does not purport to furnish a
comprehensive account of the administrative state's political legitimacy.
Some might argue, for example, that the political legitimacy of agency
rulemaking depends upon not only popular representation or popular
sovereignty per se but also consequentialist concerns for government
effectiveness. Some delegations of rulemaking power to administrative
agencies may be unwise or poorly tailored to meet the public's needs.
Moreover, even if Congress's delegations are sound, fiduciary administration
does not ensure that agency regulations will always yield the best possible
outcomes-or even salutary outcomes-for the public welfare. Indeed, for
some pressing regulatory problems there may be no consensus or majority
view about what would constitute a "positive outcome" in the first place. At

333. See ELY, supra note 2, at 87 (providing a brief overview of Ely's theory of judicial
review).
334. See id. at 100-0 I (explaining that the Constitution protects the interests of all by
structuring decision processes at all levels to attempt to ensure that everyone's interests will be
actually or virtually represented).
335. See id. at 101 (disavowing any "governing ideology").
336. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, I 064 (1980); see also Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The
Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045 (1980) ("The
fundamental difficulty with Ely's theory is that its basic premise, that obstacles to political
participation should be removed, is hardly value-free.").
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most, therefore, fiduciary representation narrows the scope of agency
discretion within minimally acceptable bounds: agencies honor popular
sovereignty as fiduciary representatives if they adopt policies that reflect
appropriate purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness,
and transparency. To the extent that questions of political legitimacy venture
beyond these constitutive principles of fiduciary representation, the fiduciary
model is arguably subject to the classic criticisms of process theory
generally-namely, that it is "fundamentally incomplete" in practice. 337
Yet the fiduciary model's very incompleteness may be a virtue. 338 As
discussed previously, presidential administration tends to stifle agency
deliberation and entrench federal regulations against legislative correction.
The fiduciary model's minimalist conception of popular representation, in
contrast, leaves ample room for continuing public deliberation both inside
and outside the rulemaking process over the best means and ends for federal
regulation. Fiduciary administration fosters public deliberation by obliging
agencies to investigate regulatory problems, engage experts, and educate
other public officials and the citizenry at large about the stakes of agency
regulation. Far from entrenching presidential preferences, fiduciary administration facilitates continued dialogue and collaboration between
administrative agencies and Congress, enabling legislators to revisit agency
rulemaking decisions and revise federal regulation through their own deliberative lawmaking processes. Federal judges, for their part, may also
reinforce fiduciary representation by correcting deliberation failures in the
rulemaking process, overturning agency regulations that are unfair,
unreasonable, or inconsistent with Congress's statutory objectives. 339 Where
administrative agencies betray congressional purpose or violate the public
trust in rulemaking, the President and Congress retain a measure of residual
control as public fiduciaries in their own right to enact new legislation or remove wayward agency officials. 340 This dynamic conversation between the
three branches, rather than presidential representation alone, best honors the
Constitution's republican vision of achieving popular representation through
polyphonic, interbranch deliberation. 341

C. The Passive Virtues of Fiduciary Administration
Sadly, the prospects of immediate congressional action to strengthen
fiduciary administration are not promising. In the past, Congress has

33 7. Tribe, supra note 336, at I 064.
338. For a general defense of minimal ism in judicial decision making, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME ( 1999).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 308-311; cf ELY, supra note 2, at 88 (arguing that
judicial review serves a representation-reinforcing role by addressing political·process failures in
majoritarian decision making).
340. Criddle, supra note 35, at 129-30.
341. See Farina, supra note 99, at 1019, 1037 (noting that the founders understood that the will
of the people cannot be captured by any single part of the government).
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deflected proposals designed to promote fiduciary administration such as
expanding notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review of agency
inaction. 342 Congress would likely resist this Article's proposal to prohibit ex
parte White House communications because the proposed change would undermine arguments for exempting similar congressional communications
from disclosure. 343 Until a major scandal erupts, Congress is unlikely to
spend its own political capital on a contentious battle with the Executive
Branch over administrative procedure, judicial review, or government
transparency.
Pending legislative action on these proposals, the Obama
Administration should voluntarily promote fiduciary administration in
agency rulemaking by observing prudential principles of nonintervention
comparable to Bickel's renowned passive virtues. 344 In The Least Dangerous
Branch, Bickel implored the Supreme Court to employ the standing doctrine,
the ripeness doctrine, and the political question doctrine to reduce the Court's
institutional footprint on the political process. 345 Bickel commended these
techniques of constitutional avoidance as a last line of defense "mark[ing] the
point at which the Court gives the electoral institutions their head and itself
stays out of politics."346 In a similar spirit of institutional humility, the
incoming Obama Administration should renounce the Bush Administration's
overly aggressive assertions of executive power and observe the prudential
principles of deliberative process, transparency, and respect for legally entrusted authority. For example, if Congress declines to revisit the APA's
exemptions to informal rulemaking, federal agencies should still commit
themselves to employ notice-and-comment rulemaking in all contexts where
these procedures would not be impracticable. If agencies decide to postpone
or discontinue rulemaking initiatives, they should take care to provide a reasoned explanation for their decision.
President Obama should also
promulgate a new executive order directing agencies to place on the public
record all communications with White House staff regarding pending informal rulemaking proceedings. Additionally, Obama should disavow the Bush
Administration's more egregious tactics of managerial control such as
placing RPOs as White House gatekeepers for agency rulemaking and the
arbitrary editing and suppression of expert reports on matters germane to

342. PIERCE, supra note 11, at 331.
343. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (defending ex parte
congressional communications with the EPA on the ground that "Americans rightly expect their
elected representatives to voice their grievances and preferences concerning the administration of
our laws").
344. BICKEL, supra note I, at 200.
345. /d. at 111-98; see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40,
42-47 (1961) (explaining and proposing the ripeness, standing, and political question doctrines).
346. Bickel, supra note 345, at 51.
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agency rulemaking. 347 By observing these and other "passive virtues" of
fiduciary administration, the Obama Administration could greatly enhance
fiduciary representation in administrative lawmaking.
The prudential principles of fiduciary administration may serve as a
critical test of character for the new Obama Administration. In his inaugural
address, President Obama affirmed the need for responsible government to
"restore the vital trust between a people and their government" by ensuring
that "those of us who manage the public's dollars will be held to account, to
spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day." 348
Obama has taken several concrete steps to realize this ideal, including instructing all agency heads to "adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure,
in order to renew their commitment to the principles embodied in FOlA, and
to usher in a new era of open Government." 349 Yet the enormity of the
ongoing financial crisis and other pressing national and international
challenges will surely test the President's resolve to safeguard the "ideals" of
deliberative, transparent government rather than compromise these principles
of fiduciary representation "for expediency's sake."35 Care must be taken
therefore to safeguard the passive virtues of fiduciary administration, lest
enthusiasm for the incoming President lead to broader centralization of
administrative lawmaking and lasting setbacks for fiduciary representation in
the administrative state.

°

347. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & R. Jeffrey Smith, EPA Won't Act on Emissions This Year:
Instead of New Rules, More Comments Sought, WASH. POST, July II, 2008, at AI ("[T]he White
House has walked a tortured policy path, editing its officials' congressional testimony, refusing to
read documents prepared by career employees and approved by top appointees, requesting changes
in computer models to lower estimates of the benefits of curbing carbon dioxide, and pushing
narrowly drafted legislation on fuel-economy standards that officials said was meant to sap public
interest in wider regulatory action."); White House Climate Change Policy-Delay, Delete, and
Deny, OMB WATCH, July 27, 2008, http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3741 (criticizing Vice
President Dick Cheney's alteration of a senior CDC official's congressional testimony on the health
risks of climate change).
348. The Address: 'All This We Will Do,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at 2; see also Brian
Knowlton, After a Day of Crowds and Celebrations, Obama Turns to Sobering Challenges, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0J/22/world/americas/22iht22obamacnd.J9577085.html (quoting President Obama's assertion that all executive officers are
"keepers of the public trust" and that his Administration would stand not "on the side of those who
want to withhold information but those who seek to make it known").
349. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 2009 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 00009 (Jan. 21, 2009).
350. See id. ("reaffirming the commitment to accountability and transparency" by directing the
United States "Attorney General to issue new guidelines governing the FOIA to the heads of
executive departments and agencies"); see also John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at Al2 (quoting Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. who stated
that "[i]t is the policy of this administration to invoke the state secrets privilege only when
necessary and in the most appropriate cases").
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VI. Conclusion
Defenders of presidential administration have characterized the
President as "a kind of democratic oracle, tasked with giving voice to the
people's power to redefine public life through democratic action." 351 The
problem with this Wilsonian conception of the Presidency is that the will of
the people is an inscrutable, Delphic guide. 352 Rarely does public opinion
crystallize into a clear national consensus on questions of federal regulation.
Moreover, it is hardly self-evident that presidential administration would be
the best strategy for vindicating public preferences in the administrative state.
As Cynthia Farina has observed, any attempt to equate the popular will with
the President's will "obscures complex problems ... of information,
prediction, and risk perception" and "slides over vexed questions ... of when
leaders should lead rather than follow and of how the act of governing becomes a process in which the collective will is formed, rather than merely
implemented."353 Confronting these complex problems of identification and
implementation, no sober-minded president could believe that his or her
preferences on matters of regulatory policy would correlate neatly with the
ever-elusive will of the people.
A far more constructive conception of popular representation is the idea
that public officers serve as fiduciary representatives for the people subject to
their power. Under this model, popular representation depends upon whether
administrative agencies act purposefully, fairly, reasonably, and transparently
with integrity and solicitude to the interests of the people subject to their
power. In contrast, the President's fiduciary role in agency rulemaking consists primarily of persuasion, coordination, and general oversight, taking care
that administrative agencies exercise their rulemaking powers within the
law's limits. Congress and the courts may also reinforce popular representation by correcting agency deliberation failures as they arise in agency
rulemaking. Within this intricate network of nested fiduciary relations lies
the best hope for meaningful popular representation in agency rulemaking.

351. See Purdy, supra note 57, at 1849 (describing Wilson's view of the presidency).
352. See A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT 73 (1913)
(quoting Sir Henry Maine as stating, "[T]he devotee of democracy is much in the same position as
the Greeks with their oracles. All agreed that the voice of the oracle was the voice of god; but
everybody allowed that when he spoke he was not as intelligible as might be desired.").
353. Farina, supra note 99, at 988.
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